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RECENT CASES
AGENCY-REPRESENTATIONS-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL
FOR AGENT'S ASSAULT WHERE CONSENT
OBTAINED BY FRAUD
Plaintiffs, a mother and daughter applying for life insurance, were
called upon by defendant insurance company's agent, who as a "field
underwriter" possessed the original application forms' and was au-
thorized to question applicants to determine whether they were
insurable risks. The agent fraudulently posed as a physician in order
to make an intimate physical examination of the two women,2 and
subsequently plaintiffs sued the insurance company for the alleged
assault by the agent. The trial resulted in a verdict for defendant,
the jury being instructed that at the time of his conduct the agent
must be acting, at least in part, for the benefit of his employer. On
appeal, held, reversed. When an agent practices deception in obtain-
ing the consent of third persons to an offensive bodily touching, the
principal is liable for the resulting intentional tort if it has placed
the agent in a position to perpetrate the fraud while acting within his
apparent authority. Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co., 243 F.2d 331
(3d Cir. 1957).
It is now uniformly held that a principal is responsible for the
fraudulent acts3 or misrepresentations 4 of his agent committed within
the agent's actual or apparent5 authority. It is equally well settled that
1. These forms were the evidence of the agent's authority, and were to be
used by the agent to record the applicants' medical history along with other
pertinent data.
2. To add credibility to this ribald scheme the agent brought along a black
bag that looked like a physician's kit. There was also evidence that he per-
formed similar "examinations" on several other female applicants. His
employer obviously did not appreciate his ingenuity as he was fired soon after
the discovery of these escapades.
3. Stillson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 79, 42 S.E.2d 121 (1947); Yoars v.
New Orleans Linen Supply Co., 185 So. 525 (La. App. 1939); New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Swain, 100 Md. 558, 60 Atl. 469 (1905); Engen v. Mer-
chants' & Manufacturers' State Bank, 164 Minn. 293, 204 N.W. 963 (1925);
McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 43 N.W. 800 (1889). See 2 MECHEM, AGENCY
§ 1984 (2d ed. 1914).
4. Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938). This is
true even though the agent acts entirely for his own purposes. See RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY §§ 261, 262 (1933):
5. Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 82 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1936).
"The doctrine of apparent authority has been rationalized almost universally
by the theory of estoppel in pais .... The elements necessary to create the
estoppel are (a) act.., of the principal creating an appearance of authority
in the agent; (b) actual reliance by a third party upon the appearance so
created; (c) reasonableness of this reliance; (d) consequent detriment to the
third party." 55 Micn. L. REV. 447-48 (1957). See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 8
(1933).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fraud by the agent outside the scope of such authority attaches no
liability to the principal.6 Normally this responsibility is limited to
actions arising out of a contract relationship7 including tort actions
for misrepresentation 8 as well as the usual contractual actions.9 The
principal's liability is imposed even though the agent acts entirely for
his own purposes, and not in furtherance of his principal's business.10
It is also well settled that a master is responsible for the torts of his
servant committed within the scope of his employment," and here it
is usually essential that the servant's act be in furtherance of his
master's business.12 Willful torts, by their very nature, are, in most
cases, outside the servant's scope of employment;13 but there is a
growing tendency to hold the master liable for the servant's willful
torts in cases in which the use of force is a normal function of the
employment 14 or in which the servant uses wrongful means to promote
his employer's business.15 The fact that the servant has been placed
in a position to commit a tort is a fact that must be considered, 16 but
6. Crawford v. Boston Store Mercantile Co., 67 Mo. App. 39 (1896); Farmers'
State Guaranty Bank v. Cromwell, 70 Okla. 199, 173 Pac. 826 (1918).
7. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 131 (4th ed. 1952); Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
342 (1931). Some courts have held that a contractual relationship is requisite
to liability. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597 (1901),
47 HARV. L. REV. 344 (1933).
8. Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 142 N.E. 695 (1890).
9. "Where the representation is made as part of the contract, rather than
as a mere inducement to it, any appropriate contractual remedy may be
had .... " 2 MVEcHEM, AGENCY § 1994 (2d ed. 1914). This includes the equitable
relief of rescission: Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Iowa 979, 170 N.W. 435 (1919);
United Bankers Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Clemons, 232 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
10. Standard Surety & Cas. Co. v. Plantsville Nat'l Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir. 1946); Duarte v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 75 Cal. App. 2d 557, 171
P.2d 574 (1946); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 262 (1933).
11. For a collection of cases dealing with civil liability of the master for his
servant's assault upon a female, See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 985, 1007 (1920). For
elements of "scope of employment," see RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 228 (1933).
12. Hardeman v. Williams, 150 Ala. 415, 43 So. 726 (1907); Barney v. Jewel
Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878 (1943); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 235
(1933). However, in some instances strict liability is imposed without regard
for the scope of employment question. See, e.g., where there is a special duty
owed: Pine Bluff & A.R. Ry. v. Washington, 116 Ark. 179, 172 S.W. 872 (1915);
Garvik v. Burlington, C.R.&N. Ry., 131 Iowa 415, 108 N.W. 327 (1906), (both
cases involving railroads); Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 288 Pac.
309 (1930), (innkeeper). Where there is a dangerous instrumentality in-
volved: Pittsburgh, C.&St.L. Ry. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24 N.E. 658
(1890). See, Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine, 26 YALE L.J. 224
(1916). Where bills of lading are fraudulently issued: Gleason v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349 (1929). However, here it is possible to find liability
on agency principles, see Ferson, Fraudulent Bills of Lading, 21 MICH. L. REV.
655 (1923).
13. See 2 MEcHEM, AGENCY §§ 1926-30 (2d ed. 1914); MEcHEM, OUTLINES OF
AGENCY'§ 394 (4th ed. 1952).
14. Orr v. William J. Burns International Detective Agency, 337 Pa. 587,
12 A.2d 25 (1940).
15. Empire Clothing Co. v. Hammons, 17 Ala. App. 60, 81 So. 838 (1919);
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stockton, 171 Miss. 209, 157 So. 366 (1934).
16. Grimes v. B. F. Saul Co., 47 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (master not liable
for assault by his building inspector because this was not a part of the task
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courts have generally concluded their analyses with a determination
of the scope of employment question.1 7 Previous cases involving in-
decent assault by an agent or servant have been decided upon this
basis.'
8
In a few cases where the wrongdoer himself was being sued for a
tortious touching where consent was vitiated by fraud, recovery has
been allowed on the basis of misrepresentation. 19 However, when the
question is the liability of a principal for such conduct of his agent, a
court applying the orthodox approach of master-servant would prob-
ably rule that such an act was a departure from the scope of employ-
ment and thus impose no liability upon the master.20 In the instant
case, the lower court emphasized the need for the employee to be
acting in furtherance of defendant's business. 21 However, the appellate
court, in dealing with an unusual fact situation,22 adopted a rather
unorthodox approach. Though the plaintiffs' action was assault for
a tortious touching in which fraud vitiated the consent, the court took
the position that the real wrong here was the deception and that the
case should be treated as one of misrepresentation. This is the ap-
proach usually taken in an action of deceit, but the court stated that
the distinction as to injuries was not important.23 Thus, it was held
that the jury should not have been instructed that the agent must be
acting, at least in part, in furtherance of his principal's business. The
court bases its decision primarily on the theory that the defendant
has placed the agent in a position24 in which the latter was able to
assigned to him); Stone v. William M. Eisen Co., 219 N.Y. 205, 114 N.E. 44
(1916) (master held liable where employee who was directed to fit woman's
brace committed indecent assault, because master had put employee in position
for this to happen).
17. Grimes v. B. F. Saul Co., supra note 16; Anderson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 128 Misc. 144, 218 N.Y.S. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 164 Tenn. 586, 51 S.W.2d 491 (1932).
18. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stockton, 171 Miss. 209, 157 So' 366 (1934),
(master held liable); Rohrmoser v. Household Finance Corp., 231 Mo. App.
11881 86 S.W.2d 103 (1935) (master not liable because acts of servant were
outside scope of employment).
19. Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868); De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d
245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
20. Rohrmoser v. Household Finance Corp., 231 Mo. App. 1188, 86 S.W.2d
103 (1935).
21. If the trial court followed the orthodox approach of tort liability, then
this element is usually necessary. See note 12 supra. However, if the court
adopted the same approach as the appellate court, this theory would be con-
trary to the position of RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 262 (1933), and the recognized
prevailing view.
22. The court cites no case directly on point and reasons by analogy, relying
heavily on the case of Robert Howarth's Sons, Inc. v. Boortsales, 134 Pa. Super.
320, 3 A.2d 992 (1939). This case is weakened as authority in that there the
principal facilitated the perpetration of the fraud by his own carelessness.
23. Instant case, 243 F.2d at 334.
24. The court quotes with approval the language of Robert Howarth's Sons,
Inc. v. Boortsales, 134 Pa. Super. 320, 3 A.2d 992, 994 (1939) to the effect that
the agent was "armed with the means of perpetrating a fraud. .. ."
1957]
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defraud third persons and must assume the risk that this situation
imposes when the agent exceeds his actual authority.
It must always be kept in mind that rules of law governing the
responsibility of one person resulting from the conduct of another
acting in his behalf are no more than reflections of current feeling as
to what the scope of this responsibility should be. Here the court,
reflecting a tendency toward extension of such responsibility, felt
that the principal should be held for such fraudulent conduct of his
agent and found liability by an unusual application of the Restatement
of Agency.26 As a precedent, this approach may well be adopted by
other courts in cases involving willful torts of the agent accomplished
by means of misrepresentation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-ADMISSIBILITY IN
STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF RESULTS OF
BLOOD TEST TAKEN WHILE ACCUSED WAS UNCONSCIOUS
Petitioner, while unconscious as a result of an automobile accident,
was subjected to a blood test to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood. Upon trial for involuntary manslaughter the results of the tests
were admitted in evidence over objection. After conviction, petitioner
brought an original habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, seeking his release from custody on the ground that
refusal to exclude this evidence violated due process of law as guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment because the manner in which
the evidence was obtained offended the sense of justice. The writ was
denied. On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. It is not a denial of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment to admit as evidence in a state criminal prosecution the results
of blood tests obtained by state officers while the defendant was
unconscious. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
The bill of rights of the Federal Constitution protects the individual
from unreasonable search and seizure by federal agencies and guar-
antees to him the privilege against self-incrimination in the federal
courts. Thus, evidence obtained by federal officers as a result of
unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in the federal
25. "The cases in which liability has been imposed under such circumstances
are sporadic and do not represent any general tendency, except as it may be
said truthfully that the general tendency is to extend the liability of the prin-
cipal or master for the torts of an agent or servant." SEAVEY, STUDIES IN
AGENCY 275, 276 (1949) referring to RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 261-62 (1923).
26. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 261-62 (1923).
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courts;' evidence obtained in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination is also excluded, at least insofar as "testimonial" evi-
dence, as distinguished from "real" evidence, is concerned.2 Certain
of the rights protected from federal infringement by the bill of rights
are also protected from state action by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, but only those rights which are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"3 and "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental ' 4 are afforded
this protection. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion have
been held to be a part of the basic concept of "due process of law."5
Due process in the fourteenth amendment has also been held to
include the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure by
state officials;6 but refusal of a state court to exclude evidence so
obtained is not a violation of this right, the states being left free to
adopt other means of enforcement if they so choose.7 Thus, while
such evidence is inadmissible in a number of states,8 the majority
hold it to be admissible.9 The privilege against self-incrimination, on
the other hand, since it was not regarded historically as part of the
"law of the land," or as one of the basic rights of man, is not considered
to be a part of the concept of "due process of law."'10 Though refusal,
on the part of state courts, to exclude evidence obtained by compelled
self-incrimination or by unreasonable search and seizure by state
officials is not, of itself, a violation of due process, such action, if
carried to gross extremes, may nevertheless violate the notion of a
"fair trial" which is the fundamental guarantee of due process of law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2263
(3d ed. 1940).
3. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
4. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
5. Those rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments which have been
held to be fundamental are: freedom of religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); speech, DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); press, Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936); assembly, DeJonge v. Oregon, supra; and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. Ibid. Federal courts will not enjoin the use of evidence obtained as the
result of unreasonable search and seizure in state criminal proceedings. Stefa-
nelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). The federal courts will, however, enjoin
federal officers from transferring evidence so obtained to state officials so
that the accused may be prosecuted in state courts where the evidence would
be admissible. lea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
8. See, e.g., Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922) (dictum); Flum v.
State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky.
152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920); Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922).
9. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921); Benson v. State,
149 Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758 (1921); Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 647, 119 S.E. 525
(1923) (per curiam); State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230, 114 S.E. 317, (1922).
10. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
1957 ]
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The differentiation depends upon a comparison of the methods used to
obtain the evidence with the sense of justice and fair play of the
community, though in the case of testimonial evidence the additional
concern with probable unreliability comes to bear. Thus, refusal to
exclude confessions obtained by state officers after merciless beatings,"
after incessant questioning for a week,12 and by apprehension of
torture13 has been held to violate due process. Furthermore, in Rochin
v. California'4 evidence forceably extracted from the stomach of the
accused, though "real" rather than "testimonial," was held to be
inadmissible in a state court under the due process clause because
the manner of obtaining the evidence was said to "shock the con-
science." 15
The defendant in the instant case sought to obtain his freedom
through the application of the doctrine of the Rochin case. However,
the Court did not find that element of brutality and offensiveness in
the taking of blood, when done by a physician, that it found in the
forced extraction of the contents of the defendant's stomach which
it found in the Rochin case. It was recognized that the blood test
procedure has become routine in everyday life, so that it is not
"conduct which shocks the conscience," nor offends that "sense of
justice" spoken of in Brown v. Mississippi.16 The evidence was of a
physical nature, and furnished a scientifically accurate method for
determining the alcoholic content of the blood. Therefore, the objec-
tion of probable unreliability present in the coerced confession cases
would not be applicable here.
In his dissent Mr. Chief Justice Warren states that the vague dis-
tinction between the instant case and the Rochin case is to be found
only in "personal reaction to the stomach pump and the blood test."
The blood test and the stomach pump are both scientific methods of
making tests and relieving distress. In both cases the operation was
performed by a physician, and in both cases body fluids were removed.
The two cases, therefore, have much in common; and, without some
distinguishing feature other than personal reaction, the same result
would seem necessarily to follow. There was active resistance in the
Rochin case, but there was no consent here either. Would the defend-
ant be deemed to have consented to the test if he had submitted only
after having been told that if he did not consent he would be forced
to give blood for the test? The absence of physical resistance should
not necessarily imply consent, especially where ability to resist is
11. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
12. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
13. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
14. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
15. Id. at 172.
16. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
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lacking. There are instances in which the personal rights of citizens
must necessarily be, to some extent, infringed upon for the common
good. In weighing the interests here the Court found another instance
in which the interests of society are paramount to private rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION-EFFECT OF POSSIBLE FEDERAL
PROSECUTION ON APPLICATION OF STATE IMMUNITY
STATUTE IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Appellee, while appearing as a witness before a state grand jury
in a proceeding under the Kentucky sedition laws,' refused to answer
certain questions on the ground that the answers would tend to
subject him to criminal prosecution by the federal government.
A Kentucky statute2 compelled witnesses to testify in such proceed-
ings and granted them immunity from further prosecution. The
questions were certified to the trial judge to determine if appellee was
entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. The judge
ruled that if appellee apprehended danger of federal prosecution,
he was privileged not to answer. On appeal, held, affirmed. Under
protection of the state constitution a witness, though granted im-
munity from further state prosecution, may refuse to answer any
question which may prove to be incriminating in a later prosecution
under federal law. Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky.
1957).
The Federal Constitution3 and the constitutions of forty-six of the
states4 guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal
cases. The peculiarities of phrasing in the various constitutions neither
enlarge nor narrow the scope of the privilege as it was known at
common law.5 The protection afforded extends to all proceedings
where testimony is to be taken,6 including investigations by a grand
1. Ky. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 432.020-.060 (1955). This statute was subsequently
held unconstitutional, as applied to sedition against the federal government.
Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. App. 1956).
2. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.070 (1955).
3. "[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
4. For an extensive list of such provisions, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 321
(1940). For the status of the privilege in Iowa and New Jersey, see McGovney,
Self-Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimony, Code Revision Bill, 5
IowA L. BULL. 174 (1919); State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117 A.2d 499 (1955).
5. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); State v. Quarles, 13 Ark.
307 (1853).
6. United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940) (all proceedings
wherein the defendant is acting as a witness in any investigation that re-
quires him to give testimony that might tend to show him guilty of a crime);
1957 ]
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jury;7 it is broad enough to cover witnesses in a criminal case as
well as the accused;8 it is personal and cannot be invoked to protect
a third person or an organization.9 In order for a witness to claim the
privilege, the danger of further prosecution must be real and appre-
ciable, 0 but it is not necessary that the testimony desired be certain
to subject the witness to prosecution or that it be conclusive proof of
the whole crime without additional testimony by others." The English
rule on which federal and state constitutional guarantees are based
generally did not protect the witness against disclosing offenses in
violation of the laws of another country;12 however, an English de-
cision in 1867 held that the privilege would be accorded when the
foreign law subjecting the witness to penalty was admitted or
proved. 13 This divergent approach to the problem is reflected in the
American decisions, but most American courts have found the former
rule to be more persuasive and have not recognized the privilege in
such cases.' 4
It is well established that the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination can be replaced by a statutory immunity. 15 It is gen-
erally said that the immunity afforded must be as broad as the privi-
lege, but the Supreme Court has uniformly held that federal statutes
Brophy v. Industrial Accident Commission, 46 Cal. App. 2d 278, 115 P.2d
835 (1941) (contempt proceeding); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 51, 118
S.W.2d 140 (1938) (any criminal prosecution); 42 GEO. L.J. 552 (1954).
7. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1953); United States v. Monia,
317 U.S. 424 (1943); Bentler v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 503, 136 S.W. 896
(1911); Pick v. State, 143 Md. 192, 121 Atl. 918 (1923); State v. Smith, 56 S.D.
238, 228 N.W. 240 (1929).
8. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892); State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853); Adams v. State,
129 Ga. 248, 58 S.E. 822 (1907); People ex rel. McKinney v. Richter, 182 Misc. 96
43 N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1943).
9. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906); United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ky. 1943); People v.
Schultz, 380 Ill. 539, 44 N.E.2d 601 (1942).
10. See Falknor, Self-Crimination Privilege: "Links in the Chain," 5 VAND.
L. REv. 479 (1952).
11. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); United States v. Molasky,
118 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1940). See 58 Amw. JuR., Witnesses §§ 81, 82 (1948).
12. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 1MiNx. L. REV. 1 (1949).
13. United States v. McRae, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867).
14. The problem of incrimination in another jurisdiction can come up in
four ways in our court system: (1) a witness in a state or federal court
claims incrimination under the laws of a foreign country, (2) a witness in a
state court claims incrimination under the laws of another state, (3) a
witness in a state court claims incrimination under federal law, and (4) a
witness in a federal court claims incrimination under state law. For a dis-
cussion of the problem and a list of cases covering each of the above situations,
see McCoRMicK, EVIDENcE 260 (1954).
15. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895); Ex parte Critchlow, 11 Cal. 2d
751, 81 P.2d 966 (1938); In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940).
For an excellent discussion of immunity statutes, see Brownell, Immunity




granting immunity from federal, but not state, prosecution may re-
place the fifth amendment guarantee 6 and that state courts may re-
quire witnesses to answer even though the immunity granted by
state law17 does not extend to federal prosecutions.18 Furthermore,
most of the state courts have held that their constitutional guarantees
do not relieve a witness from being forced to testify under a statutory
grant of immunity just because he might thereby incriminate him-
self under the laws of another jurisdiction. 19 However, a minority
of the state courts, knowing that the federal courts would not hesitate
to admit evidence gained from such forced testimony,20 have held
otherwise, usually basing their decisions on the imminence or likeli-
hood of further prosecution.2'
In the instant case the court has carefully gathered the authority
for granting the privilege in a state court when there is a danger of
federal prosecution, and has adopted the rule of People v. Den Uyl22
in holding it to be a "travesty on verity" to compel a witness to give
testimony under a state immunity statute which cannot protect him
against federal criminal prosecution. The danger inherent in our
system of dual sovereignties that testimony given in a state court may
forthwith be used in a federal court if applicable legislation exists has
been largely ignored or treated as of no consequence by the majority of
the state courts. 23 The present holding would make the mere existence
16. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1895). See also In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940)
(dictum, for discussion of federal rule). The most recent pronouncement by
the Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1955), held that im-
munity "in any court" as used in the Federal Immunity Act of 1954, 18
U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. I, 1955), applies also to state courts and that the act
would constitutionally provide immunity from state prosecution. See Conley,
The Federal Immunity Statute and Its Potential For Protecting the Witness
Against State Prosecution, 16 U. Prr. L. REV. 61 (1954).
17. For an extensive list of state statutes, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 478
(1940).
18. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
19. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954) (witness feared
federal incrimination); People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street Foundry & Iron
Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N.E. 349 (1903) (witness feared both federal and further
state incrimination); Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345(1928)
(witness feared foreign incrimination); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177
N.E. 489 (1931), affirming order in 234 App. Div. 613, 251 N.Y. Supp. 802
(1st Dep't 1931) (witness feared federal incrimination); State v. March, 46
N.C. 526 (1854) (witness feared further state incrimination). "[A]il that the
state is required to or can do is to give immunity against its own processes..
. ." In re Greenleaf, 176 Misc. 566, 28 N.Y.S.2d 28, 31 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1941).
20. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
21. State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949);
People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
22. 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
23. See, e.g., Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931),
affirming order in, 234 App. Div. 613, 251 N.Y. Supp. 802 (1st Dep't 1931) (wit-
ness forced to admit false tax returns); People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street




of federal legislation under which action could be taken sufficient
"probability" of further prosecution to warrant granting the privilege
against self-incrimination in state courts.
The ultimate answer to this problem must be based on an evaluation
of the worth of the privilege today. Either it is an "immutable prin-
ciple of justice" or it is an "obstructive anachronism" which serves
only to block one avenue for arriving at the truth.24 If the beneficial
effect of the privilege outweighs its deterrent result, the forcing of
testimony in return for an immunity which is not as wide in scope as
the privilege is not warranted. The problem need not arise in federal
prosecutions since the federal government can give immunity from
further prosecution even in state courts;25 but this is not the case with
a state immunity statute, which cannot protect the witness from fed-
eral prosecution.26 The fact of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
in many areas makes a state immunity statute which purports to
operate in such areas a meaningless legal fiction which only serves
to thwart the policy of the privilege.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MILITARY JURISDICTION-
CAPITAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS
ACCOMPANYING ARMED FORCES ABROAD IN PEACETIME
Two wives of members of the armed forces were tried and con-
victed by courts-martial for the alleged murder of their husbands,
whom they had accompanied overseas. Each was sentenced to life im-
prisonment and transported to a federal prison in the United States.1
24. The primary argument against the privilege is that it operates prin-
cipally in aid of the guilty; it can be said that its purpose and effect from
the time of its origin was the obstruction of criminal laws which the com-
munity thought to be unrighteous. The primary argument in favor of the
privilege is that it protects the privacy of the individual by shielding him
from judicial inquisition. See McCoRmvcK, EVIDENCE 290 (1954). On the value
of the privilege, see G iswoLD, THE FiTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).
25. See note 16 supra.
26. See note 18 supra.
1. Mrs. Clarice B. Covert was tried while in England for violation of
article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter referred to
as UCMJ), 64 STAT. 140 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 712 (1952), recodified into positive
law by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, § 1, 70A STAT. 1, now 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Supp.
IV, 1957). Although she pleaded insanity, she was convicted of murdering her
husband, an Air Force sergeant, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Affirmed
by the Air Force Board of Review, United States v. Covert, 16 C.M.R. 465
(1954); reversed, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 19 C.M.R. 174 (1955) for prejudicial er-
rors relating to the defense of insanity. She was then transferred from the
federal prison to the District of Columbia jail to await retrial by court-
martial at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. Mrs. Dorothy K. Smith
was convicted by court-martial for the murder of her husband, an Army
colonel, while in Japan. Affirmed by the Army Board of Review, United
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A habeas corpus proceeding was instituted in each instance,2 result-
ing in initial hearing as companion cases by the Supreme Court. The
Court initially upheld the constitutionality of article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice3 under which the jurisdiction of
military courts-martial over these civilians had been established.4 On
rehearing, held, judgment directing the release of Covert affirmed;
judgment denying the release of Smith reversed. Article 2 (11) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice cannot be constitutionally ap-
plied in times of peace to trials of capital offenses of civilian de-
pendents of the armed forces overseas. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957).
It has been settled in the past that Congress may create legislative
courts5 for the purpose of dealing with offenses committed beyond the
territorial limits of the United States as a necessary and proper
method of carrying out enumerated constitutional powers.6 Such
States v. Smith, 10 C.M.R. 350, alfd, 13 C.M.R. 307 (1953); ajFd, 5 U.S.C.M.A.
314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
2. The petition for Mrs. Smith was filed by her father, Walter Krueger, and
was discharged, United States ex rel. Krueger v. Kinsella, 137 F. Supp. 806
(S.D.W. Va. 1956). An appeal was taken to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of article 2(11)
of the UCMJ. While the appeal was pending, the Government requested
certiorari, which was granted. Kinselia v. Krueger, 350 U.S. 986 (1956).
Petitioner Covert also attacked the constitutionality of article 2(11), UCMJ,
and challenged the validity of the continuance of military jurisdiction upon
her transfer to the United States. The writ was issued, Covert v. Reid, 24
U.S.L. WEEK 2238 (D.D.C. 1955) (per curiam) and the Government appealed
directly to the Supreme Court. The Court postponed hearing until both
cases would be heard, Reid v. Covert, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
3. 64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552 (1952), recodified into positive law
by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, § 1, 70A STAT. 1 to 10 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. IV,
1957): "The following persons are subject to this chapter [code]: . ..(11)
Subject to [the provisions of] any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law,
[all] persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
outside [without the continental limits of] the United States .... ." (Bracketed
words were part of the original statute but are not found in the recodification).
4. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, rehearing granted, 352 U.S. 901 (1956);
Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, rehearing granted, 352 U.S. 901 (1956). The
decisions in these cases were far from unanimous. Chief Justice Warren,
Justices Black and Douglas made a dissent applicable to both decisions in
which it was stated that the decisions gave the military "new powers not
hitherto thought consistent with our scheme of government." Kinsella v.
Krueger, supra at 486. Justice Frankfurter made a reservation, id. at 481-85.
This dilution of the authoritative weight of the decision served to indicate that
the law in this field was by no means settled at that time. Too, it is to be
pointed out that Justice Brennan (who voted with the majority in the rehear-
ing) was not a member of the Court at the time of the first hearing.
5. "Those established under the specific power given in section 2 of Article
III are called constitutional courts. . . . On the other hand, those created
by Congress in the exertion of other powers are called legislative courts."
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
6. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (powers
enumerated in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, para. 2 to make laws regulating ter-
ritories belonging to the United States, when coupled with general powers




tribunals may be created in United States territories by direct legisla-
tion, but their establishment in a foreign nation requires a treaty or
an executive agreement with the foreign sovereignty. That these
legislative courts are not necessarily bound by all the traditional
constitutional guaranties has been previously established by a long
line of decisions.7 Though courts-martial conducted in foreign territory
are not legislative courts of the same nature as are "consular" or
"territorial" courts, Congress may define their functions and mode
of procedure also, once jurisdiction has been obtained from the foreign
sovereignty.8 The Supreme Court, on initial hearing of the instant
case, felt that the decisions sustaining these legislative courts gave
sufficient basis for extending military jurisdiction over certain civilians
under article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code without calling into question
the function of article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution of the
United States9 -the specific provision dealing with regulation of
the armed forces.'0 That this clause allows the trial and punishment
of military offenses by procedures not within the provisions of article
III, section 2 of the Constitution" has never been in doubt.12 Although
7. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (privilege of jury trial does not
extend to unincorporated territorial acquisition in certain instances); Dorr
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Congress can deny jury trials in the
unincorporated Phillipine Islands); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)
(citizens of Territory of Hawaii do not receive full fifth and sixth amend-
ment privileges if Congress does not so provide); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891) (consular court can exercise jurisdiction without providing grand jury
indictment or jury trial); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, supra note 6 (legislative
court in Florida territory not restricted by other constitutional provisions).
See also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) (in speaking of
legislative courts: "Their functions always are . . .prescribed independently
of section 2 of Article III . . . ."); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
(congressional acquisition of territory not hampered by other constitutional
limitations).
8. The relinquishment of jurisdiction by the foreign nation upon which
UCMJ art. 2(11) was made to depend was achieved in the present case by:
Agreement With The United Kingdom, July 27, 1942, 57 STAT. 1193, E.A.S. No.
355 (Covert); Administrative Agreement With Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.
TREATES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3342, T.I.A.S. No. 2492 (Smith). Es-
sentially, both allowed military jurisdiction over offenses committed by United
States forces in those nations.
9. "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces ...."
10. "Having determined that one in the circumstances of Mrs. Smith may
be tried before a legislative court established by Congress, we have no need
to examine the power of Congress 'To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.'" Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470,
476 (1956).
11. This article provides for the United States judicial power and deals
with the jurisdictional scope of the national courts.
12. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (in referring to article
III judicial powers as opposed to the power to punish military offenses, the
Court said: "[T]he two powers are entirely independent of each other.");
Ex parte Potens, 63 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Wis. 1945). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. V, which, in prescribing that "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury," excludes "Cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Mlilitia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... "
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past decisions have tended to limit any broad extensions of military
jurisdiction over nonmilitary persons under article 1,13 lower federal
courts have held that civilians having some direct relationship with
the armed forces are subject to the jurisdiction of military tribunals;14
and the Supreme Court, without passing directly on the constitu-
tionality of such jurisdiction, did, in 1952, uphold the conviction, by
military commission, of a civilian dependent accused of murdering
her military husband while in Germany. 5
13. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (discharged
serviceman cannot be constitutionally tried by court-martial for offenses com-
mitted while in service). The Toth case can be factually distinguished from
the present case, but is an important forerunner of the theories prevailing in
the latter. In speaking of the conflict that arises between article I and
article III when the former is interpreted to allow military jurisdiction over
civilians, the Court stated: "[T]he power granted Congress . . . [under art. I,
§ 8, cl. 14] would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who
are actually members or part of the armed forces." Id. at 15. (Emphasis added.)
See also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (military tribunals can-
not supplant judicial trial of civilians for offenses not relating to the war);
Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 19 (1921) (proof required that accused is mem-
ber of military before military jurisdiction can attach, the Court stating:
"Undoubtedly courts-martial are tribunals of special and limited jurisdiction
whose judgments, so far as questions relating to their jurisdiction are con-
cerned, are always open to collateral attack."); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866) (if civil courts are open and functioning, civilians cannot be
tried by military commissions acting pursuant to article I); Ver Mehren v.
Sirmyer, 36 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1929) (improper induction into armed forces
nullifies military jurisdiction).
14. Primarily, the decisions involved interpretations of article 2(d) of the
Articles of War: "The following persons are subject to these articles: .. .
(d) All persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States
without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . ." Act of Aug.
29, 1916, c. 418, art. 2(d), 39 STAT. 651 [later repealed by 64 STAT. 147 (1950)].
This article was enacted in 1916 pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 14 of
the Constitution. UCMJ art. 2(11) is the later revision of this article. See
Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945) (discharged civilian
employee formerly engaged in salvage operations in Africa but awaiting
transportation to United States, came within article 2(d)), cert. granted, 327
U.S. 777, dismissed as moot, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp.
433 (E.D. Wis. 1948) (mechanical engineer with Engineer Corps in Germany
subject to military trial); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944)
(merchant seaman on supply ship subject to military jurisdiction); In re
Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (civilian employee of govern-
ment contractor in Africa subject to military jurisdiction even though dis-
charged from employment); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va.
1943) (civilian cook on army transport comes within article 2(d)); Ex parte
Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919) (civilian superintendant of Quarter-
master Corps subject to court-martial); Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.C.N.J.
1918) (civilian cook on vessel transporting army supplies subject to military
jurisdiction); Ex parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discharged mate
traveling on military transport subject to court-martial jurisdiction). See
also 4 BULL. JAG 223-29 (1945). Even prior to article 2(d) it was recognized
that all "suttlers and retainers" to the camp and certain other civilians serv-
ing with the armed forces in the field during time of war were subject to
military jurisdiction. See WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 97-102
(2d ed. 1896).
15. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (wherein it was determined
that the wife had "accompanied" the armed forces within the purview of
article 2(d) of thi Articles of War). In the instant case, 354 U.S. at 35
n. 63, the Court distinguishes Madsen v. Kinsella by stating that Madsen arose
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Thus, there were two distinct (though not mutually exclusive) bases
available for sustaining the constitutionality of article 2 (11) of the
Uniform Code at the time of the instant case; i.e., the legislative court
precedent and the article I powers as previously construed. Never-
theless, the Court16 struck down the application of article 2 (11) to
trials of capital offenses of civilian dependents during peacetime,
holding that the legislative court decisions relied on in the initial
hearing 7 were not sufficient in themselves to justify such an ex-
tension of military jurisdiction 18 and that such jurisdiction must there-
fore conflict with article III, section 2 and the fifth and sixth amend-
ments unless article I could be reasonably construed to authorize such
extensions. By a narrow interpretation of clause 14 of article I, the
Court concluded that since these wives were not actually "in" the
armed forces, the clause did not apply to them.19 Thus, the Court
not only departed from the notion that such civilians, having become
an integral part of the extraterritorial military community, are nee-
in conquered territory being held by our armed forces and thus broader powers
were available to the military than at present.
16. It must be pointed out that there was no true majority opinion. The
concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, who, with Chief
Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan constituted the ma-
jority, were different in many respects from that of Justice Black, speaking
for the Court. Black's narrow interpretation of UCMJ art. 2(11) was chal-
lenged by both concurring opinions. Harlan, reversing his stand from the
previous decisions, based his concurrence solely upon the fact that the offenses
were capital, finding article 2(11) otherwise completely applicable. Both
Frankfurter and Harlan disapproved of Black's summary disposal of the
legislative court cases.
17. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) and the "Insular Cases," i.e., Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901).
18. The Ross case was dismissed as ... [A] relic from a different era." 354
U.S. at 12. As to the "Insular Cases," it was said: ". . . [N]either the cases
nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion." Id. at 14. The
Court also dismissed the idea that article 2(11) of the Uniform Code could
be sustained as a necessary and proper implementation of the foreign agree-
ments involved. Id. at 16. But see id. at 67 (Justice Harlan concurring):
"I do not go as far as my brother Black.... His opinion ... in effect discards
Ross and the 'Insular Cases' as historical anomalies. I believe that those
cases, properly understood, still have vitality... [and] an important bearing
on the question now before us."
19. 354 U.S. at 22: "Clause 14 does not encompass persons who cannot
fairly be said to be 'in' the military service." See also id. at 33: "The
mere fact that these women had gone overseas with their husbands should
not reduce the protection the Constitution gives them." But see id. at 43
(Justice Frankfurter concurring): "The cases cannot be decided simply by
saying that, since these women were not in uniform, they were not 'in the
land and naval Forces.' The Court's function in constitutional adjudications
is not exhausted by a literal reading of words." See also id. at 70 (Justice
Harlan discussing the article I power): "I do not think the courts-martial of
these army wives can be said to be an arbitrary extension of congressional
power. It is suggested that... Article I... could apply only to those in the




essarily subject to its discipline,20 but also undermined to some extent
the previously well established principle that the Constitution is
limited territorially in its application. It was indicated that this
result was in keeping with the traditional policy of keeping the mili-
tary subordinate to the civil authorities.2 1 That Congress could act
in such matters was conceded,22 but, having raised this problem for
the legislators, the Court not only failed to give any guidance as to
what future action would be limited by its decision, but also hedged its
ruling with certain qualifications, 23 leaving no clear indication of the
possible steps to be taken.
If such civilian capital offenders are not to escape punishment in the
future, Congress must now devise some solution. Considering the num-
ber of such individuals potentially affected, the problem is serious.24
Under whose jurisdiction will "capital" offenders now fall? If article
2 (11) is modified to conform to the present decision, it must afford full
constitutional guaranties to such persons. Congress may meet this
20. "... [Tlhese civilian dependents are part of the miltary community
overseas, are so regarded by the host country, and must be subjected to the
same discipline if the military commander is to have the power to prevent
activities which would jeopardize the security and effectiveness of his
command." 354 U.S. at 72 (Justice Harlan concurring).
21. See discussion in instant case, 354 U.S. at 23-30, concluding with: "In
light of this history, it seems clear that the Founders had no intention to
permit the trial of civilians in military courts, where they would be denied
jury trials and other constitutional protections, merely by giving Congress
the power to make rules which were 'necessary and proper' for the regulation
of the 'land and haval Forces'. Such a latitudinarian interpretation of these
clauses would be at war with the well-established purpose of the Founders
to keep the military strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil
authority." See also WnTmHROP, MILITARY LAW A.- PRECEDENTS 107 (2d ed.
1896) (quoted with approval in 354 U.S. at 35): "[A] statute cannot be framed
by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdiction
in time of peace." (Emphasis added by author.)
22. "No one, however, challenges the availability to Congress of a power to
provide for trial and punishment of these dependents for such crimes. The
method of trial alone is in issue." 354 U.S. at 47 (Justice Frankfurter con-
curring).
23. Since the holding was confined to "capital" offenses in "peacetime," many
questions arise as to implementation of the decision in the future. Le., (1)
would a non-capital offense come within the confines of the decision? Appar-
ently not. Although Justice Black appears more reticent to concede this
exception, both Justices Frankfurter and Harlan are explicit as to this point,
and without their support, the decision could not have been as rendered. It
is difficult to see, however, that if military jurisdiction is onerous, it is any
the less so upon the noncapital offender. (2) Would a capital offense committed
in wartime be subject to the decision's limitations? Probably not. The Court
throughout seems to recognize that broad powers are available during such
periods. (3) What is "peacetime"? Under present world conditions it is very
difficult to make nice distinctions between peace and war.
24. "Reliable figures show that our Armed Forces overseas are accompanied
by approximately a quarter of a million dependents and civilian workers.
Figures relating to the Army alone show that in the 6 fiscal years from July 1,
1949, to June 30, 1955, a total of 2,280 civilians were tried by courts-martial.
While it is true that the vast majority of these prosecutions were for minor
offenses, the volume alone shows the serious problem that would be presented
by the administration of a dual system of courts." Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470, 477 n.7 (1956).
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problem in several possible ways. It might provide for a system of
extraterritorial "constitutional" courts. This possibility is fraught
with problems.2 It could provide that these civilians be brought
back to the United States and tried at one of the seaboard federal
district courts. Though this solution is feasible, it also possesses cer-
tain limitations.26 Of course, the offenders might be turned over to
the host country and subjected to foreign jurisdiction; but, in view
of American policy treatment of similar suggestions in the past and,
more especially, the political repercussions arising from the recent
Girard case,27 this seems highly unlikely.2 Quite likely, the final solu-
tion could be a new policy of the armed forces denying all civilian de-
pendents the privilege of accompanying the military beyond the con-
tinental limits. 29 This too forebodes political repercussions. It would
seem-in view of the facts that extreme practical difficulties are pre-
sented in obtaining jurisdiction over these persons, that these de-
pendents do have strong ties with the military and do play a vital
role in the effective performance of the military mission, and that
military procedure does not seem to be so lacking in due process as
to be inherently arbitrary 30 -that it could have well been held that a
less onerous means of effecting the necessary and proper end was not
readily available.31
25. Assuming that Congress could readily establish courts meeting the
constitutional requirements and could secure a relinquishment of jurisdiction
from the foreign nation affected, is Congress to provide such a judicial system
in all sixty-three nations in which American forces are situated? Too, of
whom would the necessary juries be composed-foreign nationals or members
of the military community, either civilian or military? If the former, this
would seem no better a solution than turning the offenders over to foreign
jurisdiction in the first instance. If the latter, are not these persons as much
subject to "command influence" as would be the members of a court-martial?
This alternative seems extremely impractical.
26. If needed, how could foreign witnesses be required to appear, and, how
could depositions be demanded of a foreign national? Further, this solution
would prove to be somewhat expensive, especially so if later decisions were
to expand the instant case to apply also to noncapital offenses.
27. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (authority of the executive branch,
in construing an executive agreement, to relinquish jurisdiction to Japan
over an American soldier accused of killing a Japanese national, upheld).
28. Were this to be the result however, it should be noted that a system of
jury trials, and other fundamentals of Anglo-American justice, are by no
means common to all the nations in which American forces are situated.
Therefore, offenders would be subjected to punishment administered by for-
eign courts without the safeguards deemed so essential by the Court in
invalidating military jurisdiction.
29. See discussion of these alternatives in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Clark, 354 U.S. at 80-90.
30. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1956). But see instant
case, 354 U.S. at 35-39. Several letters discussing military justice and the
lawyer in the military have recently appeared in the "Views of Our Readers"
section of the American Bar Association Journal. See e.g., letter from James
G. Utrecht to American Bar Association Journal, 43 A.B.A.J. 677 (1957).
31. It is felt that article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice could
have been sustained under the traditional standard of the "necessary and




BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CUMULATIVE
VOTING AND STATUTE AUTHORIZING CLASSIFICATION
OF DIRECTORS
Plaintiff,' a stockholder and director of defendant corporation, sought
a declaratory judgment to determine whether a statute2 granting the
right to classify corporate directors and stagger their terms was a
violation of a right protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution3 to
vote cumulatively in all elections of directors. Plaintiff contended
that the operation of this statute would prevent the use of cumulative
voting to its full advantage and consequently was a violation of his
constitutional right. On appeal from a judgment for defendant, held,
affirmed. A state statute authorizing a staggering of director elections
does not violate the state constitutional grant of the right of cumulative
voting, for this grant is not a guarantee of maximum efficiency of this
method of obtaining minority representation on the board of directors.
Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
Cumulative voting4 is generally conceded to have as its objective
representation of minority stockholders on the board of directors.5
must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its
limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the
constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with
respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned
to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). See also Knox
v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1869); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
1. Amici Curiae briefs were filed in the Supreme Court by the Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., the Curtis Publishing Co., The Latrobe Steel Co., and the American
Window Glass Co.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 48, 2852-4, 2852-1202 (1938).
3. Art. 16, § 4.
4. Cumulative voting entitles each shareholder to as many votes for direc-
tors as the product of multiplying the number of shares he has times the
number of directors to be elected. See, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 177 (1946);
3 COOK, CORPORATION § 609a (8th ed. 1923).
5. The minority shareholders of a sufficiently large number of shares can
gain representation on the board if they cast the total number of their votes
for one director. To find the percentage of shares needed to elect a single
director (X) where cumulative voting is allowed, take the total percentage of
shares voting (100%), divide this by the number of directors to be elected
100%
plus one (N+I), and add one share to the quotient. X = - + 1. If four
N+1
directors are being elected, 20% of the stock plus one share could elect a single
director.
100%




In a number of states this privilege is made mandatory either by
constitutional provision6 or statute,7 while under the statutes of other
jurisdictions the privilege is merely permissive.8 Classification of
directors 9 is a system in which the board of directors is divided into
two or more groups chosen at separate elections.10 Classification is
said to achieve continuity of experienced directors" and to make it
more difficult for outside interests to acquire representation.12 Where
a constitutional provision for cumulative voting is found to co-exist
with a statute that allows staggering or classification of directors, a
conflict appears to be present. Such a statute would appear to under-
mine the constitutional right of cumulative voting, for, by decreasing
the number of directors to be elected at any one time, the size of the
minority required to elect a single director is noticeably increased.'3
The number of shares needed to elect more than one director can be deter-
mined by multiplying the numerator by the desired number of directors.
To elect two of four directors would take 40% plus one share.
2 (100%)
X=- - + I share = 40% + I share..
4+1
6. Cumulative voting in corporate elections has been made mandatory by
constitutional provision in thirteen states. ARIz. CONST. art. 14, § 10; IDAHO
CONST. art. 11, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Ky. CONST. § 207; MISS. CONST. art.
7, § 194; Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 4; NEB. CONST. art.
XII, § 5; N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 135; PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4; S.C. CoNsT. art. 9,
§ 11; S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
7. The privilege is made mandatory in seven states by statute. Anx. STAT.
ANN. § 64-244 (1947); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 2235 (Deering 1953); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3303 (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.32 (1937); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.58 (Baldwin 1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.32.070 (1952);
WYo. COriT'. STAT. ANN. § 44-109 (1945).
8. Twenty states have such statutes. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-4 (1953);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.10 (Supp. 1954);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-207 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:32 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 39(3) (1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.26(3) (1947); NEV. COmP.
LAWS § 1629 (1929); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:85 (1955); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 14:10-15 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-6-6 (1953); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW
§ 49; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-110 (1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.68 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.170(4) (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 116, § 23 (1938);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-313 (1956); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.29 (1956); VT.
STAT. § 5784 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-203 (1950).
9. There are eight states that permit classified boards where cumulative
voting is mandatory. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.35 (1955); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271.345(4) (1955); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.315 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 15-402-403 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-115 (1943); N.D. REV. CODE §
10-0508 (1943); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-403 (1938); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3028 (1955).
10. Thus the shareholder would determine the number of votes he has by
multiplying the number of directors to be elected at this meeting times the
number of shares he owns.
11. Staggering of directors is considered to be a control device. See, BAL-
LANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 1182 (1946). Where a group keeps the experienced
directors on the board it is likely that the "experienced" directors are those
who have the most favorable attitude towards the control group.
12. It is, of course, more difficult to gain a representation on the board of
directors where, because of classification into two or more groups, the outside
interest must wait until the next election to unseat the directors that had
previously been elected by the control group.
13. To illustrate the effect of classification on the right of cumulative voting
suppose that a corporation has a board composed of nine directors. To deter-
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Thus, the purpose of cumulative voting, minority representation, is
adversely affected.
The recent case of Wolfson v. Avery 4 held that a staggering statute
is invalid where there is a constitutional guarantee of the cumulative
voting privilege. The language of the constitution was interpreted to
guarantee to a minority the right of representation on the board in
the same proportion that their shares bear to the total number of
shares.15 Because it required a much larger minority to gain a single
representative on a classified board, the classification statute was con-
strued as being unconstitutional. The court in the instant case dis-
tinguishes the Wolfson case on the basis of a difference in the language
of the two constitutional provisions.16 The instant case holds that the
Pennsylvania Constitution, while granting the right of cumulative
voting, does not guarantee success in gaining director representation
in proportion to the shareholdings of the minority 7 The court gives
other examples of corporate usages diluting voting strength, the valid-
ity of which might be subject to question if classification were declared
mine the percentage of votes needed to elect a single director use the formula
given in note 5 supra.
100%
X = -+ I share = 10% + I share to elect a single di-
9+1
rector when all nine members of the board are chosen at a single election.
Suppose that under a classification statute the board is divided into three
classes of three directors each.
100%
X = - + 1 = 25% + 1 share to elect one of the classified
3+1board. There is a 250% increase in the number of shares needed to elect a
single director when the same board is staggered.
14. 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955). See Stephan, Cumulative Voting and
Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wolfson v. Avery. 31 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 351 (1956).
15. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the purpose of the constitutional
provision was "to afford a minority protection in proportion to its voting
strength." 126 N.E.2d at 710.
16. The cumulative voting provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads
as follows: "In all elections for directors or managers of a corporation each
member or shareholder may cast the whole number of his votes for one candi-
date, or distribute them upon two or more candidates, as he may prefer."
PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4 (Emphasis added.) The Illinois Constitution states that
each shareholder shall have the right "to cumulate said shares, and give one
candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number
of his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle
among as many candidates as he shall see fit. . . ." ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3
(Emphasis added.) The Pennsylvania court takes the view that the classifica-
tion of directors creates candidates for election, and that the language of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is broad enough to allow this construction. The
term "directors" in the Illinois Constitution is viewed by the Illinois court as
meaning that all directors are to be elected at one time, and the number of
shares was to be multiplied by the total directors.
17. To support this proposition, Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45,.
133 N.E.2d 780 (1956) is cited by the court in a footnote, but this case is dis-
tinguishable in that it deals with a statute that makes mandatory the right of
cumulative voting.
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unconstitutional. 18 Because of the nearly three-quarters of a century
that staggering has been widely employed under the statute, the court
feared that the legality of the elections and the validity of the acts
of many corporate directors might be challenged if the classification
statute was nullffied.19
The distinction made by the court between the instant case and
the Wolfson case appears to be weak. The court may have failed to
look adequately into the intent of the constitutional framers. Such
intent might reasonably be determined from an early Pennsylvania
case20 decided in the period closely following the constitutional con-
vention. This case placed an interpretation on cumulative voting that
appears to agree with that of the Wolfson case. The question immedi-
ately arises as to where the Pennsylvania court would draw the line
on allowing classification of directors or other corporate control devices
to undermine the efficiency of the constitutional provision.21 Struggles
for corporate control will undoubtedly create future controversies in
this area which will have to be resolved. Those states having a similar
conflict between a statute and the state constitution should act to
avoid the dilemma faced by the court here. This might be accomplished
by either amending the constitution to allow classification of directors
or repealing the classification statute altogether.
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS-SECRETARY-TREASURER'S
AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE LITIGATION
The secretary-treasurer of plaintiff-corporation instituted litigation
for conversion of corporate property. Although the by-laws of the
corporation delegated the responsibility of general management to the
board of directors, no board meetings were ever held and the secre-
18. The examples given by the court are "having a small board instead of a
large number of directors, having longer terms for directors than merely one
year, having vacancies on the board filled by the board itself as permitted
by many statutes .. ., issuing non-voting stock or stock with limited voting
rights, granting voting rights to bondholders or holders of preferred stock
under certain conditions, granting unconditional voting privileges to preferred
stock not previously enjoyed by it . . . ." 128 A.2d at 79. The court also
pointed out that the defendant corporation was a public utility and the city
appointed five of the company's twenty-one directors, leaving only sixteen
directors for stockholder election.
19. The Wolfson case answers the problem thusly: "These fears are unwar-
ranted. Corporate directors exercising the functions of their office under the
color and claim of an election, even though unlawfully elected, are neverthe-
less de facto directors." 126 N.E.2d at 711.
20. Hays v. Commonwealth ex. rel. McCutcheon, 82 Pa. 518 (1876).
21. In Wright v. Central California Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885),
a majority of the stockholders approved a resolution to elect the company's
seven directors at seven separate elections. This was held to be a violation of
the California constitutional provision for cumulative voting since cumulation
of votes would be impossible where there was only one director to elect.
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tary-treasurer was in almost complete control of management affairs
at the time of this action. Defendants contended that the suit was
not properly brought because the corporate by-laws required majority
consent of the directors for corporate action and the institution of
litigation had not been authorized by the board. The trial court's
denial of a motion to vacate the service of summons and complaint
was upheld by the appellate division. On appeal, held, affirmed. A
secretary-treasurer who has been acting as the general manager of
a corporation may institute litigation without express authorization
from the board of directors. Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman,
2 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610 (1957).
Normally the authority of a corporate officer to act with reference
to a particular matter is derived from express provisions of the
corporate by-laws,' or from special resolution of the board of direc-
tors.2 However, an officer may acquire implied authority to do certain
acts beyond the scope of his express authority as a result of the
acquiescence of the board of directors in his doing those acts over
a period of time.3 In addition to the authority that may originate from
these sources, some cases have held that the president of a corporation
may also have certain inherent authority that exists by virtue of the
office.4 Although a subordinate officer is generally regarded as a
ministerial officer limited to the exercise of expressly delegated
authority,5 it has been held that such an officer may, under certain
circumstances, acquire implied authority to do certain acts beyond
the scope of his express authority.6 Thus where a subordinate is
1. Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897).
2. American Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 111 Fed. 782 (8th Cir. 1901);
T. M. Gilmore & Co. v. W. B. Samuels & Co., 135 Ky. 706, 123 S.W. 271 (1909).
3. Arizona Southwest Bank v. Odam, 38 Ariz. 394, 300 Pac. 195 (1931);
Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917); Clucas
v. Bank of Montclair, 110 N.J.L. 394, 166 Atl. 311 (1933).
4. Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 305 Mass. 213, 25 N.E.2d 332
(1940); Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Warwick Sportswear Co. v. Simons, 4 Misc. 2d 482, 13 N.Y.S.2d 321
(Sup. Ct., App. T. 1939); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Eustis, 8 Tex. Civ. App.
350, 28 S.W. 227 (1894). To the effect that a president of a bank has inherent
authority to initiate litigation, see Annots., 10 A.L.R.2d 701, 705 (1950), 67
A.L.R. 970, 978 (1930), 1 A.L.R. 693, 704 (1919). And that the president of a
corporation has inherent authority to sue when the twofold purpose is to
protect corporate assets and to counteract bad faith of other directors, see
Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 701, 707 (1950). For the proposition that a president lacks
inherent authority to act outside of expressly delegated authority, see Pacific
Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202, 53 Pac. 634 (1898); Campbell v. Hanford, 67 Cal.
App. 155, 227 Pac. 234, 237 (1924) (dictum); Ney v. Eastern Iowa Telephone
Co., 162 Ia. 525, 144 N.W. 383 (1913); Jeanerette Rice & Milling Co. v.
Durocher, 123 La. 160, 48 So. 780 (1909); Bright v. Metairie Cemetery Ass'n,
33 La. Ann. 58 (1881); Ashuelot Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 507
(1848).
5. People v. International Steel Corp., 102 Cal. App. 2d 935, 226 P.2d 587
(1951); Blackwell v. Saddleback Lumber Co., 129 Me. 270, 151 Atl. 534 (1930);
Scott v. New York Filling Co., 79 N.J.L. 231, 75 Atl. 772 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
6. Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917);
Clucas v. Bank of Montclair, 110 N.J.L. 394, 166 Atl. 311 (1933).
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general manager of the corporation and has customarily performed
certain acts he may acquire such implied authority.7 Under this view
an extremely limited number of cases have held that a subordinate
officer may acquire implied authority to initiate litigation where he
is general manager of the corporation and has customarily initiated
suit.8
In upholding the authority of a secretary-treasurer to initiate litiga-
tion in the instant case the court relied heavily upon the facts that
the secretary-treasurer had been in general charge of the corporation
during its active period 9 and, by agreement with the president, was
to be in charge of the company's dissolution. Another consideration
was that the secretary-treasurer had hired counsel to defend the
corporation on prior occasions. These factors seem primarily responsi-
ble for the court's holding that implied authority had lodged in the
secretary-treasurer, although some emphasis is placed upon the fact
that the corporation was small and closely held,10 there being only
four shareholders, and the fact that the president was completely
inactive in the management of the corporation. The court aptly points
out that Sterling Industries v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.," holding that
a president of a corporation lacked authority to initiate litigation, was
not applicable,' 2 and the court's rationale seems amply justified. The
Sterling case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case because
the Sterling case dealt with a situation in which the president of a
corporation had requested approval to begin suit from a board of
directors and failed to gain consent because of a split vote.13 In the
instanf -case two of the directors submitted affidavits that the insti-
tution of the suit was disfavored, but there was no evidence that the
two had formally voted against its initiation.
The holding in the instant case is a burgeoning of the authority of
7. St. Louis, Ft. S. & W.R. Co. v. Grove, 39 Kan. 731, 18 Pac. 958 (1888);
Barkin Constr. Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156, 116 N.E. 770 (1917); Phillips
v. Campbell, 43 N.Y. 271 (1870); Perry v. Council Bluffs City Waterworks
Co., 67 Hun 456 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1893).
8. Bristol County Say. Bank v. Keavy, 128 Mass. 298 (1880); Wintner v.
Rosemont Realty Co., 195 Misc. 980, 91 N.Y. Supp. 452 (2d Dep't 1905); Whit-
man v. Koted Silk Underwear Co., 38 Misc. 796, 78 N.Y. Supp. 880 (New York
City Ct. 1902).
9. "Schneider [the secretary-treasurer] was for all intents and purposes
its general manager and executive head, undoubtedly with the full knowledge
and acquiescence of the other stockholders and directors." Instant case, 141
N.E.2d at 613.
10. "It is to be borne in mind that we are dealing with a small closely held
corporation, whose affairs were conducted without formality of any kind.... "
Id. at 614.
11. 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
12. Instant case, 141 N.E.2d at 612.
13. For relevant material and cases collected on this point, See Notes, 18
FoRDHAm L. REV. 133 (1949), 35 IowA L. REv. 315 (1949), 52 HARV. L. REV.




an officer beneath the rank of a president and allows a subordinate
officer to exercise authority that was not contemplated in the corporate
by-laws. It is unusual because it upholds the authority of a subordinate
officer to initiate a suit, an action which is generally started at the
instance of the president of the 'corporation. 4 It is interesting to note
that no cases directly in point were cited as precedent for the court's
decision. However, the cases cited do illustrate the proposition that a
corporate officer may acquire "presumptive"'5 or implied16 authority
outside of the express authority delegated to him. A New York court
has sustained a secretary-treasurer's authority to institute suit,17 but
no reference was made to this decision by the court in the instant case.
In summary the court's extension of authority to the secretary-
treasurer appears to be a logical conclusion when the full facts of his
general managing practice are viewed with the conversely abstaining
habits of the president and members of the board of directors.18
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDER VOTING AGREEMENTS-
APPLICABILITY OF VOTING TRUST STATUTE TO POOLING
AGREEMENT GIVING IRREVOCABLE PROXIES TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF SHAREHOLDERS
Plaintiff, a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation, sought
a declaratory judgment1 to declare invalid a stock pooling agreement,
executed between the majority shareholders and eight individuals
designated as "agents." Although the agreement was not intended to
create a voting trust, the agents were given authority to transform it
into a voting trust. These agents, comprising the majority of the
14. See note 1, supra.
15. Regal Cleaners & Dyers v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir. 1921); Lydia E.
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 305 Mass. 213, 25 N.E.2d 332 (1940); Elblum
Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Application
of Bernheimer, 266 App. Div. 868, 43 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1943); Warwick Sports-
wear Co. v. Simons, 4 Misc. 2d 482, 13 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1939).
16. A secretary has implied authority to contract for a corporation through
general management practices. Barkin Constr. Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156,
116 N.E. 770 (1917). A treasurer has implied authority to sign corporate
promissory note when he generally manages business and has signed forty
to fifty notes before. Perry v. Council Bluffs City Waterworks Co., 67 Hun
456 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1893).
17. Whitman v. Koted Silk Underwear Co., 38 Misc. 796, 78 N.Y. Supp. 880
(N.Y.C. Ct. 1902).
18. For discussion relevant to the instant case, see 2 N.Y.L.F. 429 (1956);
42 Vi. L. REv. 679 (1956).
1. Prior to this action the corporation was preliminarily enjoined from
recognizing any action taken at a board meeting at which two agents violated




corporate directors,2 represented on the board of directors the share-
holders participating in the agreement. Under the agreement 3 the
stockholders delivered their stock certificates with irrevocable voting
proxies to their agents, who in turn deposited them in escrow for
the term of the agreement. Although the shareholder retained an in-
direct right to control the voting of his stock,4 his wishes could be de-
feated by the decision of seven of the agents or by an arbitrator in
the event at least seven of the agents could not agree. The lower court
found that the agreement was not a voting trust but was rather a
valid pooling agreement.5 On appeal, held, reversed. A shareholders'
voting agreement in which the voting right is divorced from the bene-
ficial ownership through the medium of irrevocable proxies for a
period of ten years is a voting trust and thus is invalid if it fails to
comply with the requirements of the voting trust statute.6 Abercrombie
v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957).
Stockholders owning voting stock may exercise their voting power
pursuant to an agreement 7 with other shareholders, 8 and, unless such
agreements contemplate fraud 9 on other shareholders the courts will
2. At all times the number of directors has been fifteen.
3. In substance the applicable provisions of the agents' agreement were as
follows: Paragraph 1. Shareholders will deliver to the agents the certificates
of stock owned by them and receive proper receipt for all certificates so de-
livered. The certificates and stock power are to be deposited in escrow sub-
ject to withdrawal at any time by any seven of the agents....
Paragraph 3. Shareholders shall deliver to the agents and shall keep in effect
proxies for the term of this agreement giving the agents power to vote for any
act or proceeding which the shareholders themselves could vote for. The vote
shall be exercised as a unit as any seven of the agents shall determine. If any
seven agents shall fail to agree then the question in disagreement shall be
submitted for arbitration to some disinterested person.
Paragraph 4. Each shareholder has the right to remove its agent at any time
without cause....
Paragraph 6. The proxies are to be irrevocable for a period of ten years.
Paragraph 7. Any seven of said agents may at any time withdraw said stock
certificates from escrow and transfer said stock to the persons then acting as
agents, as trustees to be held under a voting trust. See Instant Case, 130 A.2d
at 342-43.
4. The stockholder can direct his agent how to vote on a decision to be
made by the agents as a group. Id. at 346.
5. The usual definition of a voting agreement is a contract among two or
more stockholders whereby they retain not only the legal and beneficial
ownership of their shares, but also their right to vote them, and merely agree
to vote all their combined stock as a unit in some predetermined way to
accomplish some corporate purpose. Note, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 640, 641 (1936).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1953). The parties to the agreement had
not transferred the stock on the corporate books and had not filed a copy of
the agreement in the corporation's principal office as required by the statute.
7. Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897)
(voting pool); Groub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N.E. 609 (1926) (proxy
agreement).
8. Memphis & C.R.R. v. Wood, 88 Ala. 630, 7 So. 108 (1889).
9. Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 So. 742 (1888) (illegal restraint on
alienation of stock); People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923) (ir-
revocable voting agreement); Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24
Atl. 32 (1890) (contravention of statutes providing no proxy shall be voted
after a certain length of time).
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generally declare them valid.'0 Such agreements are distinct from
voting trusts and are not subject to the same principles." The voting
trust involves a more complete surrender of control over the stock
owned by the shareholders than any other control agreement.12 By it
the shareholder may be deprived not only of any right to vote for di-
rectors but also of any voice in management decisions.13 The voting
trust is considered to be a true trust.14 Thus, it is held that voting
trustees are subject to the usual fiduciary duties to certificate hold-
ers.'5 In the absence of a statute16 authorizing voting trusts, some
courts would declare an agreement which separates the beneficial
ownership of the stock from the legal title invalid per se as contrary
to public policy.'7 Recent cases, however, demonstrate a trend to up-
hold them if formed for a lawful purpose and capable of being
executed in a lawful manner. 8
The instant case illustrates the problem encountered by shareholders
who enter into contracts to bind each other as to how they will vote
their stock. Courts that have considered the problem of enforcing
these contracts have reached diverse results. In Ringling Bros.-Barnum
and Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling 9 an agreement between two
shareholders to act jointly in exercising voting rights and to abide
by an arbitrator's decision in the event of an impasse was held not to
be a voting trust but to be a valid stock pooling agreement.20 How-
ever, specific performance was not granted because there was no
grant of power in either party to exercise the voting rights of the
other. In Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry.,21 three persons purchased
stock under an agreement that the stock should be voted in one block
as determined by a ballot among themselves. The court found the
contract contained an implied proxy, irrevocable because coupled with
an interest, and specific performance was granted since the irrevocable
10. E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
11. 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2064 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).
12. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 184b (1946).
13. Ibid.
14. See Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts,
20 WASH. L. REV. 129, 131 (1945).
15. Brown v. McClanahan, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945); Wool Growers
Service Corp. v. Ragan, 18 Wash. 2d 655, 140 P.2d 512 (1943).
16. More than twenty states are listed as having voting trust statutes, in
5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2080.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).
17. Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N.C. 776, 64 S.E. 894 (1909);
Harvey v. Linville Implement Co., 118 N.C. 693, 24 S.E. 489 (1896). See also
opinion of Pitney, J., in Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 Atl. 773, (Ct. Err.
& App. 1904).
18. Gumbiner v. Alden Inn, Inc., 389 Ill. 273, 59 N.E.2d 648 (1945); Redman
v. Minnis, 43 Ohio App. 371, 183 N.E. 299 (1932).
19. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441, (Sup. Ct. 1947).
20. The court felt the voting trust statute did not purport to include an
agreement whereby parties bind each other as to how they vote their shares
as long as they retain legal title to their own shares and have no power to
vote the shares of the other party. Id. at 447.
21. 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
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proxy gave each party the right to vote the stock of the other. In
the instant case the court found that an agreement which separated
voting power from the other attributes of stock ownership through
the medium of fiduciaries with irrevocable proxies was, in substance,
a voting trust. As such, it was void for failing to comply with the re-
quirements of the voting trust statute.
To include the present agreement in the modern conception of a
voting trust is unusual because each agent was subject to some control
by his respective stockholder-principal;2 and, furthermore, the fact
that the agents did not retain individual control over the stock while
deposited in escrow 23 would seem to deny the conclusion that legal
title vested in the agents. However, the opinion indicates that an im-
portant factor which enabled the court to reach its decision was that
the agreement itself gave the agents the power to transform the agree-
ment into a voting trust. And, with the Delaware voting trust statute2 4
as an aid to the court had little difficulty in declaring the present
agreement a voting trust. The scope of the statute seems to include
agreements generally not considered to be voting trusts25 since it is
designed to place restrictions 26 on all agreements whereby stockhold-
ers transfer stock and vest voting control, though not necessarily legal
title, in a trustee. The position taken by the court may be rationalized
as an attempt to encourage the use of the statutory voting trust and
thereby avoid the uncertainty and litigation surrounding non-statutory
voting schemes.
CRIMINAL LAW-DEFENSES-REJECTION OF THE
DURHAM RULE AS THE TEST OF INSANITY
Defendant, relying on insanity as a defense, was convicted of en-
tering a national bank with the intent to commit larceny.' The trial
court instructed the jury on the issue of insanity in terms of the
22. See note 4 supra.
23. The stock could not be withdrawn from escrow unless seven of the eight
agents agreed to such withdrawal.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1953).
25. "The modem voting trust, especially one formed under statutes enacted
in several states, transfers to and vests in the trustees the stock and the legal
title to it, and the stockholders receive voting trust certificates in lieu of their
holdings so transferred." Barney v. First National Bank, 90 P.2d 584 (Cal.
App. 1939), quoting 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2075 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952).
26. Restrictions contained in the statute are: (1) agreement shall not exceed
ten years, (2) a copy of the agreement must be filed in the principal office of
the corporation in the State of Delaware, (3) shares issued pursuant to such
agreement must be transferred on the books of the corporation. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1953).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1952).
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"right and wrong" test and the "irresistible impulse" test. On appeal,
the defendant contended that the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury that the accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease.2 Held, affirmed. Knowledge of
right and wrong as developed by M'Naghten's Case3 is still the basic
test for criminal responsibility in the federal courts. Sauer v. United
States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
Various tests for criminal responsibility have been developed to
assist the jury since the courts first began to recognize that punish-
ment of criminal acts should be mitigated for persons of unsound
mind 4 The rule which arose from the famous M'Naghten's Case has
become the basic criterion for criminal responsibility in most of the
common law jurisdictions.5 That is, the accused will not be held
criminally responsible if he was unable to distinguish between right
and wrong at the time of the offense.6 Several courts, feeling this test
to be inadequate, have supplemented it with the rule that a defendant
should not be held criminally responsible if his act was the result
of an irresistible impulse.7 Though both tests have been the subject
of intense criticism,8 they have long been the rule in the federal
courts.9 Recently, however, one court found both tests inadequate as
an exclusive criterion and adopted a much broader approach to the
problem, which has become known as the Durham Rule, under which
the jury is instructed that "the accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect."' 0
2. The requested instructions are in accordance with the rule announced in
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
3. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4. For extensive historical background on the various tests, see BIGGS, THE
GUILTY MIND 81-117 (1955); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIINAAL DE-
FENSE 50-174 (1954).
5. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115
A.2d 502 (1955); in general, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447, 1452 (1956).
6. "[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
7. "If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost
the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act
in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed .... ." Parsons
v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866 (1887). See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447, 1453
(1956).
8. See CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE passim (1931); GLUECK, MENTAL Dis-
ORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW passim (1925); GUTTMACHER and WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY and THE LAW passim (1952); WEmOFEN, THE URGE To PuNIsH
passim (1956); ZLBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN passim (1943).
9. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897); Howard v. United States,
232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
10. Durham v. United States 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This is
essentially the same position as that taken by New Hampshire as early as 1870
in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
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The instant case illustrates how reluctant both the federal and
state courts have been to follow the test suggested by the Durham
case" though it has been hailed with great enthusiasm by legal writers
and psychiatrists. 12 The instant court states several reasons why it
will not adopt a new approach to insanity. The first of these is the
possibility that the defendant might avoid both the jail and the asylum
under existing federal procedure, which does not provide for commit-
ment after the jury verdict. 13 The second is the Supreme Court's
apparent approval of the M'Naghten test in cases which it has con-
sidered.14 The third reason seems to be the apprehension of the
increased responsibility which would have to be delegated to the jury
and the increased reliance upon psychiatric testimony under the
Durham approach. 15 The final reason is the indefiniteness of the word
"product" used in the instructions to the jury in the Durham case.16
Under the conditions created by the lack of any uniform federal
procedure for commitment proceedings after the verdict, the court's
reasoning in the instant case appears sound. However, it is sub-
11. Other jurisdictions which have rejected the Durham "product" test are:
Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956) (cited as controlling
in the instant case); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954); People v.
Carpenter, 11 Ill. 2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); Flowers v. State, 139 N.E.2d 185
(Ind. 1956); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); State v.
Kitchens, 286 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 1955); State v. Goyet, 132 A.2d 623 (Vt. 1957);
State v. Collins, 314 P.2d 660 (Wash. 1957).
12. For approval of the Durham rule, see Douglas, The Durham Rule: A
Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REv. 485 (1956);
Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U.
Cm. L. REV. 320 (1955); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U.
Cm. L. REv. 331 (1955). For criticism of the rule, see Wertham, Psychoauthori-
tarianism and the Law, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 336, 337 (1955).
The alternative tests proposed in the Model Penal Code apparently have
abandoned the M'Naghten rule for a more liberal rule allowing the jury to
determine what is and what is not sufficient evidence of insanity; or whether
the accused should be held responsible for his act. See, Sobeloff, Insanity and
The Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J.
793, 878 (1955).
13. "The defense of insanity comes under the "not guilty" plea, and the
jury is not required to state specifically its ground for acquittal. Thus there
is no way for the Government to determine the basis of the jury verdict.
It therefore sets the accused free." 241 F.2d at 651.
14. "The Supreme Court thus at least tacitly approved the test as being
either incapacity (resulting from some mental disease or defect) to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong with respect to the act, or, although able
to so distinguish, the inability to refrain from committing the act." Id. at 643.
15. "One evident consequence of the Durham decision is to shift the entire
question of criminal responsibility to the jury .... It is the function of the
court to develop a standard of criminal responsibility.. . ." Id. at 646.
"[T]he solution may better lie, not in the layman accommodating the
specialist, but rather in the adjustment by the specialist of his technical vo-
cabulary to the language of the layman." Id. at 647.
16. "If the word means that the jury must find that the accused would
have committed the act even if he had not suffered from the abnormality
involved, the test is too broad. If the test is, . . . one of causation, then the
court is introducing into an area already burdened with serious problems a
concept which has plagued the law of torts since its inception." Ibid.
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mitted that the choice between the two tests discussed does not
involve a basic revision in our concept of criminal responsibility as
suggested in the instant court's conclusion.17 We have progressed
slowly towards recognizing that detention and treatment of the
mentally sick, rather than imprisonment, will go further towards
protecting our public safety.18 It appears that a large part of the
courts' hesitation to apply the Durham rule is due to their reluctance
to deprive themselves of the control they now have under the tradi-
tional tests. It is submitted that the Durham rule is the better
psychological approach to the problem of legal insanity, but perhaps
only through proper legislation will it be accepted by the courts as
an advancement in the field of criminal law.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-
RES JUDICATA IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Defendant was indicted for conspiring to violate the Internal Rev-
enue Code by engaging in the business of a distiller without paying
taxes thereon.' One of the overt acts allegedly committed in further-
ance of the conspiracy was the joint possession by defendant and two
others of an unregistered distillery. As proof of possession, the Gov-
ernment offered the testimony of an Internal Revenue agent to the
effect that he had seen the defendant running away from a house
wherein an illegal still was found. The week preceding the conspiracy
trial, defendant had been acquitted by a jury of a substantive charge
of possession 2 of the identical still at the identical time and place.
The same testimony of the agent had been offered and admitted in
this prior prosecution. The judge in the conspiracy trial admitted the
agent's testimony and the jury found defendant guilty. On appeal,
held, reversed. The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of
the fact of possession previously determined by the acquittal of de-
17. Id. at 652. It should be noted that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia recently pointed out that the Durham approach did not
prevent all use of the "right and wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests. "[W]e
did not purport to bar all use of the older tests: testimony given in their
terms may still be received if the expert witness feels able to give it, and
where a proper evidential foundation is laid a trial court should permit the
jury to consider such criteria in resolving the ultimate issue 'whether the
accused acted because of a mental disorder.'" Douglas v. United States, 239
F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also, Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42,
44 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
18. See Sobeloff, supra note 12, at 879.
1. 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) (general conspiracy statute);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5005 (levy of tax upon distiller).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 5174, 5601.
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fendant on the substantive charge. Yawn v. United States, 244 F.2d 235
(5th Cir. 1957).
Preliminarily, it is necessary to distinguish the application of the
doctrines of double jeopardy and res judicata in criminal cases. The
former prohibits in toto twice subjecting one to trial for the same
offense.3 The latter prevents relitigating in a subsequent proceeding
between the same parties issues of fact or law previously determined
in the former suit, though the actions be different.4 The Supreme
Court of the United States seems to have sanctioned the applicability
of res judicata in criminal cases before the federal courts,5 and it has
been applied not infrequently.6 The doctrine's applicability has be-
come extremely important because of the increasing complexity of
statutory criminal law wherein one criminal act may give rise to suc-
cessive prosecutions for separate offenses based on the same act.7
The constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy 8 cannot be properly
invoked by a defendant in such situations because of the requirement
of identity of offenses. 9 Although some courts have either intention-
3. "The prohibition of the Constitution is against a second jeopardy for
the 'same offense'; that is, for the identical crime. The offenses charged in
the two prosecutions must be the same in law and fact." United States v.
Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345, 351 (E.D. Mo. 1941). Perhaps the leading case
on double jeopardy is Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
4. This application of res judicata is commonly termed "collateral estoppel"
and is the terminology adopted by the RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
For excellent treatments of the doctrine in general, see Scott, Collateral
Estoppel By Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942); von Moschzisker, Res
Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1928); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,
65 HARv. L. REV. 818 (1952).
5. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Oppen-
heimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); cf. United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930).
State courts have generally accepted res judicata in criminal cases. See e.g.,
Mitchell v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 So. 76 (1904); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,
17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); Commonwealth v. Spivey, 243 Ky. 483, 48 S.W.2d 1076
(1932); People v. Kleinman, 168 Misc. 920, 6 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See
also Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943).
6. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Simon,
225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955); Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.
1954); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); United States
v. Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp.
179 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); see Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943).
7. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L. J.
513 (1949). It is well established in the federal courts that the commission
of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and
distinct offenses. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Braverman
v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S.
78 (1915); Note, 37 ILL. L. REV. 183 (1942).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V and all but five state constitutions (Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusettes, North Carolina, Vermont) prohibit double jeopardy.
9. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 531 (1915) (acquitted of
substantive offense and later convicted of conspiracy to commit the same
offense); Westfall v. United States, 20 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1927) (convicted
of substantive crime and then convicted of conspiracy); Louie v. United
States, 218 Fed. 36 (9th Cir. 1914) (acquitted of conspiracy and convicted of
aiding and abetting). The usual test for determining whether offenses are
the same is the "same evidence test." Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641
(1914); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 395 (1902). For a discussion of
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ally or unintentionally applied the double jeopardy prohibition to a
later prosecution for a separate offense,'0 the sounder and more con-
sistent approach is the use of res judicata. Most of the difficulty and
confusion which presently exists concerns the question of just which
facts involved in the former action should be deemed determined
by that action and therefore conclusive in a subsequent proceeding."
Some courts require only that the fact have been in issue and have
been necessary to the result.12 Other courts further distinguish be-
tween "ultimate" and "mediate" facts,13 holding that only facts "ulti-
mate" in the first suit are conclusive in the second. 14 The leading case
of Sealfon v. United States15 seems to indicate that the trial court
should look to the former record, paying particular attention to the
instructions given there, to determine which issues are not open to
litigation in the second prosecution. 6
The court in the instant case holds that the Government may not
relitigate in the conspiracy trial "the precise fact of possession" de-
cided in the former prosecution by a general verdict of acquittal.'7
As a requisite to applying res judicata the court requires only that the
fact have been previously determined in the former trial. In the
first prosecution the agent's testimony was intended to serve as a
basis from which the jury might infer the ultimate fact of possession.
In the subsequent conspiracy prosecution the testimony was offered
for exactly the same purpose. The court concludes that to admit the
testimony would be to allow the relitigation of the possession issue
undoubtedly determined previously by defendant's acquittal.18 This
this and other tests employed, see Comment, 38 J. CRmvr. L. & CRnIN=OLOGY
379 (1947).
10. Carson v. People, 4 Colo. App. 463, 36 Pac. 551 (1894); State v. Wheelock,
216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203
S.W. 357 (1918); Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 90-93 (1937).
11. See Rothschild, Res Judicata and Collateral Attack as Phases of Ju-
dicial Estoppel, 7 BROoKLYN L. REv. 271, 283-94 (1938).
12. Southern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897); United States v.
De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); Dobbins v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 22 Cal. 2d 64, 136 P.2d 572 (1943); Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N.E.
732 (1893). 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 693 (5th ed. 1925) apparently is in ac-
cord with this view.
13. "[A] 'fact' may be of two kinds. It may be one of those facts, upon
whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right, in question;
or it may be a fact, from whose existence may be rationally inferred the
existence of [an ultimate fact] .... The first kind of fact we shall for con-
venience call an 'ultimate' fact; the second, a 'mediate datum.'" Per Judge
Learned Hand in The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944).
14. The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra note 13; Campbell v. Milliken, 20
Colo. App. 299, 78 Pac. 620 (1904); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating
Co., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W. 374 (1908); King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844).
15. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
16. Cf. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
In the instant case, neither the indictment nor the record of the former trial
were offered by defendant's counsel. 244 F.2d at 236 n.1.
17. Id. at 237.
18. The court says that to give "possession" as litigated in the first trial
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conclusion is favorably supported by United States v. De Angelo,19 a
very similar case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, upon which this court puts considerable reliance.
20
The already difficult question of which issues have been previously
determined is amplified where, as here, the former trial results in
a general jury verdict 2 Indeed, in some cases res judicata has not been
applied because it was impossible to determine which issues were de-
cided by a former general verdict of acquittal.22 The question in the in-
stant case was not whether the former acquittal decided either that
defendant did not run away from the house where a still was found
or that no still was there. The verdict decided only that a reasonable
doubt existed as to defendant's possession of an illegal still. Yet to
allow the jury in the conspiracy trial to draw the same inference of
possession from the same testimony previously employed in the
former trial is clearly contrary to the principles of res judicata. If
the testimony were admitted in the conspiracy trial, the jury there
would be called upon to determine the identical fact with the same
degree of certainty, viz., reasonable doubt, that the former verdict
determined.3 This is not to say that the testimony would be inad-
missible for all purposes. If offered for some other relevant purpose
such as the identification of defendant with the conspiracy and ac-
companied by limiting instruction, it might well have been properly
admissible. But the prosecutor made it clear to the trial judge here
that the testimony was offered solely for the purpose of proving the
any different legal meaning from "possession" as litigated in the second would
be an unwarranted "exercise in semantics." 244 F.2d at 237-38.
19. 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).
20. In United States v. De Angelo, supra note 19, defendant was con-
victed with others for conspiring to commit a robbery. A former prosecution
of defendant on a substantive charge of robbery had resulted in defendant's
acquittal. The court held that the prosecution was estopped from relitigating
in the conspiracy trial the facts of defendant's presence and participation in
the robbery previously in issue and determined by the former verdict of
acquittal. The admission in the conspiracy trial of some of the same evidence
used by the prosecution as proof of these facts in the former trial was held to
be reversible error. But since the prosecution in the second trial relied on
some other evidence than that used in the first trial and which might be
sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy, the court did not dismiss
the case, but granted a new trial. The same procedure as to disposition of the
case was employed by the court in the instant case.
21. A difficulty which obviously might be minimized to some extent by
the more frequent use of special verdicts and findings of fact.
22. E.g., United States v. Dockery, 49 F. Supp. 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); United
States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mo. 1941); State v. Erwin, 101 Utah
365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).
23. One of the primary reasons for the general holding that a criminal
judgment is not determinative of any issue in a later civil proceeding other
than the fact of its rendition, is the difference in degrees of pursuasion re-
quired in the two proceedings. See e.g., Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d
787 (1941); Harper v. Blasi, 112 Colo. 518, 151 P.2d 760 (1944). See also 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 653-56 (5th ed. 1925).
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fact of possession.24 So offered, the result reached in the instant case
is unquestionably sound.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE-MANDAMUS-
APPELLATE REVIEW OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
Petitioner, a United States district judge, referred antitrust cases1
to a master for trial,2 over objections of all parties. After petitioner
denied motions to vacate the orders,3 petitions for writs of mandamus
were filed in the court of appeals, seeking to force petitioner to vacate
the orders. Although petitioner contended that courts of appeals do
not have the power to issue such writs to review interlocutory orders
unless review on appeal after final judgment would be frustrated,
the writs were granted.4 Held (5-4), affirmed. The court of appeals has
the power, in exceptional cases, to entertain a petition for a writ of
mandamus to review unauthorized interlocutory orders, in advance
of final judgment. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
Generally, Congress has limited review by the federal appellate
courts to final decisions of the trial court,5 thus continuing a policy6
24. "The Court: The court understands, Mr. District Attorney, the testi-
mony is offered for the purpose of establishing the ninth alleged overt act
[possession] of the charge in this case?
"Mr. Madsen: That is correct." 244 F.2d at 237-38 n.2.
1. Rohling v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., 17 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. Ill. 1954), Shaffer
v. U.S. Rubber Co., 99 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
2. The reference was made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (b), which provides:
"(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in
matters of account, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it." For a general discussion of this rule, see
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 53.05 (Supp. 1956).
3. The motions were made by all parties to the action.
4. Howes Leather Co. v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 964 (1956), 65 YALE L.J. 1057 (1956).
5. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952).
6. This policy has been firmly entrenched by judicial precedent:
"Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal
appellate procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act and has been
departed from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right
to any review at all.. . ." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940).
See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); United States
Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202 (1945); In re Chapel
& Co., 201 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1953). For a general discussion of the final
judgment rule, see 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 54.04 (Supp. 1956); Crick,
The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis For Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932);
Porter, Appeals from Interlocutory and Final Decrees in the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal, 19 B.U.L. REv. 377 (1939); Notes, The Final Judgment Rule
in the Federal Courts, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 239 (1947), The Writ of Mandamus:
A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 CoLUm. L. REV. 1102 (1950).
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enunciated in the first Judiciary Act.7 Congress has, however, provided
for appeals from certain enumerated interlocutory orders.8 It has
further increased appellate review by the All Writs Act,9 under which
the federal courts may issue all writs necessary in aid of their juris-
diction.O This "aid of jurisdiction" requirement has placed a limita-
tion upon the use of the prerogative writs, beyond which the courts
have not ventured." In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 2 the
Supreme Court announced, as one of three propositions, 13 that the
prerogative writs may not be used as a substitute for appeal.14 The
Roche case presents a clear example of how use of the prerogative
writs has been severely circumscribed by the firmly entrenched final
judgment rule.15
The Court in the instant case stated that as the court of appeals
could, at some stage of the proceedings, entertain an appeal, it had
power to issue writs of mandamus reaching the cases, as the excep-
tional circumstances present warranted the use of the writ. The Court
warned, however, that this conclusion could not be taken to be an
authorization for the indiscriminate use of prerogative writs as a
7. § 22, 1 STAT. 72 (1789).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952). Section 1292 confers upon courts of appeals
jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts, relating
to injunctions, receivership, and certain admiralty and patent infringement
cases.
9. "(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
dictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)
(1952).
10. Provided, however, there is no clear congressional policy against any
appellate review of a particular type of order, in which case that type is not
reviewable through the medium of a writ. See Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311
U.S. 199 (1940) (remand order).
11. The traditional use of the writ of mandamus has been limited to those
cases where the action of the district court tended to frustrate or impede the
ultimate exercise by the court of appeals of its appellate jurisdiction or to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or
to compel it to exercise its authority when it was its duty to do so. See Roche
v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 582 (1943); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29 (1926); In re Josephson,
218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954). As extraordinary remedies, the writs are
reserved for extraordinary cases, as where judges of a district court were
persistently violating rules of practice promulgated by the Supreme Court.
McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940) (mandamus granted to vacate
reference to a master, since reference under 53 (b) is to be the exception).
This was a per curiam decision, which was explained in Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, supra. See Los Angeles Brush 1fg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701
(1927) (mandamus, but not granted, although the Court indicated that it
would enforce a provision in the equity rule comparable to 53 (b)).
12. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
13. The remaining propositions were: 1. The All Writs Act does not limit
the issuance of a writ to a case where appellate jurisdiction has already
attached; 2. On an application for a writ the question is one of propriety, not
power. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, supra note 11; cf. Ex Parte Peru,
318 U.S. 578 (1943); Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932); McCelland
v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910).
14. 319 U.S. at 26; see Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29 (1926).
15. 319 U.S. at 30.
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means of reviewing interlocutory orders, as mandamus should be
resorted to only in extreme cases.16 The exceptional circumstance
found to exist here, bringing this case into the restricted area wherein
the use of the extraordinary writs is allowed, was the "clear abuse
of discretion" by the district judge in his reference of the cases to a
master, which action amounted to little less than depriving the parties
of their right to a trial before the court. The fact that the calendar
was congested, plus the unusual complexity of the cases, and the great
length of time required for trial did not amount to such an exception
as to justify the reference, in view of petitioner's knowledge of the
instant cases at the time of the reference and his long experience in
the antitrust field, as such reference is to be "the exception and not the
rule.' 7 Although there was no action by the district court which
tended to frustrate or defeat appellate review of the ruling upon final
judgment, a fact which in the Roche case was considered a basis for
refusing the issuance of the writ,18 the Court interpreted the All
Writs Act as conferring on the courts of appeals the discretionary
power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances
which existed here.19
The Court here has refused to continue a rigid policy of finality,
and has used the writ of mandamus to review an interlocutory order
without doing substantial violence to the final judgment rule. Granted
that the traditional jurisdictional requirement has been loosened, the
limitation of the writs to "exceptional cases" indicates that the term
will not be considered an elastic one, at least for the present, although
it is likely to become as hazy and ill-defined as the "jurisdiction" and
"final judgment" requirements have in the past.20 Not resting its
16. 352 U.S. at 255.
17. The Court cited Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701
(1927), and McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940), see note 11, supra.
In James the Court considered a congested calendar as a good basis for a
reference; McCullough cited only James. The dissent in the instant case
attacks the reliance upon these cases, stating that neither can be accepted as
supporting th6 action of the court of appeals here. In both the former cases
the Court was concerned with the enforcement of the equity rules "which
it is the duty of this court to formulate and put in force." 352 U.S. at 266
(Emphasis added by Court.) The dissent cited In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174,
179 (1st Cir. 1954), to the effect that the Supreme Court might have been
exercising a different sort of power from the strictly auxiliary power given
the courts of appeals by the All Writs Act. 352 U.S. at 265.
18. 319 U.S. at 26 (1943).
19. In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan states that the Court, by its
decision in the instant case, has seriously undermined the long-standing policy
against piecemeal appeals, by its interpretation of the All Writs Act as
conferring "an independent appellate power in the Courts of Appeals to
review interlocutory orders. . . ." thereby engrafting upon federal appellate
procedure a new standard of interlocutory review, never embraced by Con-
gress, which allows interlocutory appeals by leave of the appellate court.
352 U.S. at 263.
20. See Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judg-
ment Rule, 50 COLUm. L. REV. 1102 (1950); Comment, Federal Rule 54(b) and
The Final Judgment Rule, 47 MicH. L. REV. 233 (1948).
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decision on the traditional "aid of jurisdiction" requirement, the
Court seems to take the approach of considering the necessity for the
writ by balancing the general policy of finality against the adequacy
or inadequacy of appeal upon final judgment, as applied to the par-
ticular facts in the case.21 This approach escapes the injustice which
an inflexible, rigidly applied final judgment rule is bound to work at
times. There is a need for some flexibility, so that in exceptional situa-
tions review may be had, through the use of the writs, of an other-
wise non-appealable order. In addition to using the prerogative writs
in aid of their appellate jurisdiction, in the so-called "hardship" cases
the appellate courts should expand the use of their power under the
All Writs Act to supplement their appellate power, affording relief
from the final judgment rule.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE -VENUE-
ACTION AGAINST CORPORATION FOR PATENT
INFRINGEMENT
Petitioner, a West Virginia corporation, was sued for patent in-
fringement in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Although petitioner had an established place of business
in that district, the action was dismissed for lack of venue because
there was no showing of acts of infringement there.' The special venue
statute2 for patent infringements restricts venue to the district "where
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts
of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."
However, a general venue statute3 provides that a corporation may be
sued "in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." In
reversing, the court of appeals held that the general section's defini-
tion of corporate residence must be "read into" the meaning of the
word "resides" in the special section, thereby permitting suit wher-
ever petitioner is "doing business". 4 Held, reversed. Venue in patent
21. This general view has been advocated by some writers as a possible
answer to the hardships of the final judgment rule. See, e.g., 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE, ff 54.10(6) (Supp. 1956); Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis
For Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Pos-
sible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 COLUm. L. REV. 1102 (1950).
1. Transmirra Products Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 133 F. Supp. 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1952).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).




infringement actions is controlled exclusively by the special section
enacted for this type of litigation. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
The exclusiveness of the special venue provision for patent in-
fringements under the 1911 Judicial Code 5 was firmly established in
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.6 However, the question was
re-opened by certain changes and additions in the 1948 code revision,7
creating considerable conflict over venue of corporate defendants in
patent infringement: suits. The -broad, new definition of corporate
residence set out in title 28, section 1391 (c) of the United States Code,8
coupled with the word substitutions in the special venue provision,
section 1400 (b),9 has precipitated a semantical battle over whether
these respective venue provisions are "complementary"'10 or "mu-
tually exclusive"." Generally, courts which have held section
1400(b) solely controlling in patent infringement suits have felt
that the reviser's notes following this section show an absence of
congressional intent to change the law existing prior to the code re-
vision;'2 that the second alternative in section 1400 (b), 13 when ap-
plied to corporations, is emasculated by an insertion therein of the
5. 36 STAT. 1100 (1911).
6. 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
7. 62 STAT. 869 (1948).
8. Section 1391(c) is the first legislative enactment defining the term "resi-
dence" as applied to corporations.
9. The reviser's notes following § 1400 state: "Words in subsection (b)
'where the defendant resides' were substituted for 'of which the defendant is
an inhabitant.' . . . Words 'inhabitant' and 'resident,' as respects venue, are
synonymous. (See reviser's note under section 1391 of this title.)" H.R. REP.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A130-31 (1947); 28 U.S.C. at p. 4197 (1952).
10. The "complementary" theory insists that the definition of a corporation's
residence in § 1391(c) be "read into" § 1400(b), in keeping with the clear
meaning which the words of the respective sections convey. See Note, 21
GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 610, 618-21 (1953).
11. Basis for the "mutually exclusive" theory lies in the legislative history
of venue in patent infringement cases. From the abuses and injustices en-
gendered by the early general venue statutes, the Act of 1897, 29 STAT. 695,
and the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 STAT. 1100, both sought to restrict venue in
patent infringement suits by providing special and separate sections to con-
trol this area of litigation. See Note, supra note 10, at 612-15.
12. See note 9 supra. In drafting the revision of title 28 it was decided that
intended changes or modifications of prior law would be clearly explained
in the reviser's notes appurtenant to each code section. H.R. RFs. No. 308,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, Al (1947). The Chief Reviser of title 28, W.W. Barron,
reported: "[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of
language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly ex-
pressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a change
of meaning but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler terms the
original meaning of the statute revised." 8 F.R.D. 439, 445-46 (1949). (Empha-
sis added.) It should be noted that the use of the word "inhabitant" in the
1911 code avoided the present problem, since "inhabitant," as regards a
corporation, was held to refer to the state of incorporation. Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Bulldog Elec. Products Co. v. Cole Elec.
Products Co., 134 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1943); Weller v. Penn. R.R., 113 Fed. 502
(C.C.D. Colo. 1902).
13. See note 2 supra, and text pertinent thereto.
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definition of corporate residence set out in section 1391 (c) ;14 and that,
in any event, where statutes contain both a general and a special pro-
vision, the latter being within the scope of the former, terms of the
special provision prevail over those of the general provision. 15 But
courts which have held section 1391 (c) applicable to, and therefore
complementary to, section 1400 (b) have forcefully expressed to the
contrary that the pertinent statutory text, which is clear and un-
ambiguous, necessitates no reference to legislative history through
the reviser's notes,16 which are at best unclear as to the relation be-
tween sections 1391 (c) and 1400 (b).17 Furthermore, these courts feel
that implicit in an extention of the "mutually exclusive" theory is the
anomalous effect of rendering section 1391 (c) inapplicable to all
other special sections having residence as a basis for venue; 18 and,
finally, that a broadening of venue in patent infringement suits to any
district wherein the corporate defendant "is doing business" is con-
sistent with Congress' express desire to facilitate procedural fairness
in suits against corporations, commensurate with the increased di-
versity of corporate activity.19 The result of these opposing arguments
14. "And if a corporation can be sued where it 'is doing business,' what
possible purpose can be served by the second venue alternative, 'where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and estab-
lished place of business'? . . .Such an anomalous theory, if embraced, would
make a dead letter out of the second alternative in the patent venue section."
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1952).
But see Note, Venue in Patent Infringement Suits in the Federal Courts, 47
Nw. U. L. REV. 699, 703 (1952), wherein it is suggested: "In answer to this
argument, it may be pointed out that 1400(b) applies to both corporate and
individual infringers, and that the second clause of 1400 (b) is not rendered
superfluous when applied to individuals, rather than corporations."
15. See MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944); D. Ginsberg
& Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). Consequently, a special
patent venue section will control over a general corporation venue section.
See 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PHOCEDURE 135 (1950). To
conclude otherwise would negative the privilege of limited venue which was
conferred upon defendants in patent cases by the predecessor to § 1400 (b).
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, supra note 14.
16. See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 244 (1945). But see C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d
410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1952), wherein the court concluded that the Collett case
was not applicable since the provisions involved there were not inconsistent,
and therefore effect could be given to both provisions.
17. See Farr Co. v. Gratiot, 92 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D. Cal. 1950). See also
Note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 610, 621 (1953) where it is suggested: "The re-
viser's notes, which purport to represent the legislative intent behind Title
28 of the Code, present a weak foundation because the notes are silent as to
the relation between Section 1391(c) and Section 1400(b). This manifests
a failure to recognize the problem."
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1396 (collection of internal revenue taxes), 1397 (inter-
pleader), 1398 (Interstate Commerce Commission's orders), 1400 (a) (copy-
rights), 1402 (certain actions against the United States) are all special venue
provisions having residence as a basis for venue. If § 1391(c) is not to be
used to define § 1400(b), then it would not be used to define "resides" in the
above provisions, and would be virtually meaningless. See Farr Co. v.
Gratiot, supra note 17, at 322 (dictum); Note, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 699, 703
(1952).
19. Transmirra Products Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F.2d 885, 886 (2d
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is a virtual even split in court decisions on this issue.20 Indeed, the
perplexities of the problem were pointed up in 1952 by the Supreme
Court's four-to-four split in Cardox v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,
21
leaving the question unresolved.
Thus, the importance of the instant case cannot be overstated; for
the first time since the 1948 code revision, the Supreme Court has
rendered a binding decision on this troublesome question of statutory
interpretation.2 2 It is interesting to note that in doing so, the court has
rejected an appeal from the preponderance of text writers for a con-
trary decision.23 These writers would have had the court give effect
to the "practical" approach of extending venue of the corporate de-
fendant commensurate with the growing complexity of corporate
operations. Instead, the effect of the decision at hand is to rectify a
case of awkward legislation 24 by giving great weight to the reviser's
notes,25 and concluding therefrom that the legislature intended no
change in the special venue provision for patent infringement. There-
fore, the ruling in the Stonite case remains in force under the 1948
code revision, and the general expansion of venue in federal courts
is denied in the particular area of suits for infringement of patents by
corporations.
While the benefits to the district courts of a firm ruling are obvious,
certain questions remain unanswered. If section 1391 (c) is not to
be used to define "resides" in section 1400 (b), will it likewise be in-
applicable to the other special venue provisions?26 If so, what then is
Cir. 1956); 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 153-54
(1950).
20. "Six district courts and one circuit court of appeals have held that the
definition of corporate residence for venue purposes set out in Section 1391 (c)
is not applicable to actions involving patent infringement, whereas four dis-
trict courts and one circuit court of appeals have held to the contrary."
Note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 610, 611 & nn. 3, 4, 5, 6 (1953). Since 1952, one
circuit court has rendered a decision holding § 1400(b) solely controlling.
Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1955). One circuit has
rendered a contrary decision. Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205
F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1953).
21. 344 U.S. 861 (1952).
22. The C-O-Two case was affirmed by an equally divided court, no
opinion accompanying the order. Ibid.
23. Professor Moore, a member of the revision staff, has stated with refer-
ence to the relation of § 1391(c) to § 1400(b): "While this definition is
found in the general venue section it is believed that it is a definition of
general applicability to determine corporate residency in § 1400(b)." 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2139, 2140 (2d ed. 1948). See MOORE, COMMENTARY
ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 185 (1949): "[T]he general provisions of § 1391(c)
dealing with the residence of . . . corporate defendant[s] . . . will have a
qualifying effect when such parties are defendants to a patent infringement
action." See also Notes, 56 CoLumv. L. REV. 394, 415 (1956), 21 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 610, 621-22 (1953), 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 699, 704-05 (1952).
24. See 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3115 (1952), where Justice Frankfurter said with
reference to the code of 1948, while hearing argument on the C-O-Two
case: "It is about as sloppy a piece of codification as any instance I know of."
25. See notes 9, 12 supra.
26. See note 18 supra.
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its purpose? Such a result would be difficult to reconcile with decisions
which have held section 1391 (c) applicable to the special venue
provisions of the Jones Act 27 and the Clayton Act.28 It can be argued
that the same "legislative intent," so crucial in reaching the decision
in the instant case, may well be thwarted by applying this holding
to cases involving corporate defendants under other special venue
sections.29
HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT-
COLLATERAL ATTACK LIMITED TO DEFECTS ON
FACE OF RECORD
Tennessee law gives juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction of per-
sons under eighteen years of age charged with crimes other than mur-
der and rape.' Petitioner was seventeen when convicted and sentenced
in criminal court on pleas of guilty to charges of kidnaping, armed
robbery and grand larceny. Thereafter he brought habeas corpus
proceedings, contending that the convictions were void for lack of
jurisdiction. At the hearing petitioner proved conclusively that he
was seventeen at the time of his conviction and denied state evidence
that he had given his age as eighteen at the time of trial. The record
of the former proceeding was silent on the point. The habeas corpus
petition was sustained. On certiorari by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, held, reversed. The criminal court is a court of general juris-
diction and therefore its judgments may not be questioned in habeas
corpus proceedings for jurisdictional defects not appearing on the face
of the record. Bomar v. State ex rel. Stewart, 300 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn.
1957).
At common law a judgment rendered by a court of general criminal
jurisdiction was conclusive proof in a habeas corpus proceeding that
confinement was legal.2 The same principle applied in collateral
attacks on civil judgments. 3 Later, American courts began looking
27. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). See Phillips v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Mincy v. Detroit & Cleveland
Nay. Co., 94 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Bagner v. Blidberg Rothchild Co.,
84 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
28. 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v.
National Theaters Corp., 103 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Lipp v. National
Screen Service Corp., 95 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
29. See note 18 supra.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-242 to -243, 37-265 (Supp. 1957).
2. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1952); Ex Parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) *193 (1830); Crosby, Lord Mayor, 3 Wils. K.B. 188, 95 Eng.
Rep. 1005 (1771). See Habeas Corpus Statute, 1679, 31 CAR. 2, c. 2.
3. Kilcrease's Heirs v. Blythe, 25 Tenn. 378 (1845); Peacock v. Bell, 1 Wins.
Saun. 73, 85 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1668).
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behind the judgment to see if the record disclosed facts showing that
the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction.4 Congress has broadened
the scope of the writ by statute, particularly in 1867,5 so that federal
courts will accept evidence dehors the record showing violation of
federally protected rights.6 Similar results have been reached under
a California statute,7 and courts in other jurisdictions have used
language indicating a broader view not resting on statutes.8 The
general view, however, still appears to be that the judgment of a court
of general jurisdiction is immune to collateral attack by habeas corpus
proceedings unless the record itself shows that the judgment is void
for lack of jurisdiction.9
The court in the instant case was first faced with the problem of
determining whether the criminal court is a court of general juris-
diction even though a portion of that court's jurisdiction had been
carved away by the statutes creating the juvenile court. Although
this is a problem in definition which has not lent itself to easy reduc-
tion to an all-purpose rule,10 the view adopted by this court-that a
court which proceeds "according to the course of the common law"" is
a court of general jurisdiction-does not appear to be out of harmony
with results reached elsewhere.12 The Tennessee court, rounding out
a consistent rule to limit collateral attacks on judgments, whether
civil or criminal, then held that the jurisdiction of the criminal court
may not be attacked by habeas corpus for defects not appearing on
the face of the record. Although its decision rests on precedents con-
cerning civil judgments,13 the result is in harmony with the historic
4. See People ex tel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559 (1875).
5. 14 STAT. 385, c. 28 (1867). The essential wording as retained today ex-
tends the writ to a prisoner who "is in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1952).
6. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915). For a discussion of the development of the federal writ, see
Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus upon Federal Judgments in
Criminal Cases, 23 WASH. L. REv. 87 (1948).
7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1484 (Deering 1949). See Ex Parte Seeley, 29 Cal. 2d 294,
176 P.2d 24 (1946).
8. See e.g., State ex rel. Clayton v. Jones, 192 La. 671, 188 So. 737 (1939);
Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950); Petition of
O'Leary, 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
9. Reynolds v. McFadyen, 259 Ala. 235, 66 So. 2d 89 (1953); Schultz v. Lain-
son, 234 Iowa 606, 13 N.W.2d 326 (1944); Superintendent of Maryland State
Reformatory v. Calman, 203 Md. 414, 101 A.2d 207 (1953); State ex rel. Pinker-
man v. Utecht, 231 Minn. 331, 43 N.W.2d 97 (1950); 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus §
16 (1944).
10. See 15 C.J., Courts § 2 n.49 (1918).
11. 300 S.W.2d at 887, citing Pope v. Harrison, 84 Tenn. 82 (1885).
12. See 21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 3, 7 (1940).
13. Puckett v. Wynns, 132 Tenn. 513, 178 S.W. 1184 (1915); Wilkins v. Mc-
Corkle, 112 Tenn. 688, 80 S.W. 834 (1904). The rationale of the rule was first
expressed by a Tennessee court in Miller's Lessee v. Holt, 1 Tenn. 49, 53-54
(1804): "In cases where the court proceeds according to the course of the
common law, and not in a summary way, all preliminary steps in a cause might
be presumed. But where an authority is given by statute to be executed in
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rule on habeas corpus. The court indicated, however, that this rule
may not be ironclad and left the door open for future exceptions in
cases in which it should appear necessary to carry out the policy of
the juvenile court statutes, which the court says is to keep persons
less than eighteen years of age away from adult convicts.14 In the
case at bar the court felt that this purpose was not controlling be-
cause petitioner had passed the age of eighteen and had already spent
a year and a half in the penitentiary with adult criminals.15
Those used to thinking of the scope of habeas corpus in relation to
liberal federal court rules may be shocked that the writ cannot be
used in a state court to free a prisoner from a sentence of a court
which should not have tried him in the first place. It should be remem-
bered that petitioner had the right to have the sentence reviewed on
appeal and still has the right to seek executive clemency. If these
remedies are deemed inadequate to provide for all situations, it does
not necessarily follow that expansion of the extraordinary remedy of
habeas corpus is the proper way of meeting the need. Such expansion
multiplies administrative problems, as the federal courts have learned,
especially those which have been harried by "prison lawyers."'01
This, in turn, may create pressure to develop devices for curbing
abuse,17 and curbing abuse without curbing proper use is a delicate
and difficult matter. The glory of the writ is that it gives the prisoner
the power to force his jailer to account immediately to a responsible
judge for his detention, and to do so as often as apparent flaws in the
jailer's authority may be discovered. The jailer is the defendant; and
unless he is to become a mere formal party like the lessee in the old
action of ejectment, it is hard to see why he should be asked to defend
himself for accepting at face value the judgment of a court of such
stature that it could pronounce a death sentence.
INCOME TAXATION-DEDUCTIONS-PREPAID
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
Petitioner, a cash basis taxpayer, is a Missouri corporation engaged
in the business of ownership and management of real estate. Tax-
payer protected its property with insurance coverage and in computing
a summary manner, the record of such proceeding ought to show that the
material parts of such authority were pursued; otherwise, they cannot be
intended."
14. 300 S.W.2d at 888.
15. Ibid. But cf. Sams v. State, 133 Tenn. 188, 196, 180 S.W. 173, 175 (1915);
State ex rel. v. Griffin, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. 230 (1918).
16. For a discussion of these problems, see United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 212 (1952).
17. Id. at 214.
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its income for 1950, 1951 and 1952 deducted, as a business expense,
insurance premiums paid during such years even though the insurance
coverage so purchased extended to years subsequent to 1952. The
Tax Court, agreeing with the Commissioner, determined that prepaid
insurance deductions must be prorated over the life of the policies.1
On petition for review to the court of appeals, held, reversed. Where
no substantial distortion of income results, a cash basis taxpayer may
deduct prepaid insurance premiums in the year in which the premiums
are actually paid. Waldheim Realty and Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 245
F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
Business expenses are deductible if they are ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. 2 No deduction is allowed for capital expenditures,
or amounts paid out for new buildings or permanent improvements.
3
However, certain expenditures made by a business are classified as
amortizable capital expenditures, which may be deducted; but the total
amount of the expenditure deduction must be prorated over the life
of the item in question.4 Examples of amortizable capital expenditures
include prepayment of rentals,5 bonuses for the acquisition of leases,
6
bonuses for the cancellation of leases7 and commissions for negotiating
leases. 8 In all of the above situations the items for which money was
paid are treated as exhaustable assets. Deductions are allowed but
proration is required primarily because the life of the asset extends
beyond the taxable year.
The question of when prepaid insurance premiums may be deducted
depends upon whether the prepaid insurance is considered an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense or an amortizable capital expen-
diture. This question has caused the Commissioner, the taxpayer and
the courts no little difficulty. In 1934 the Commissioner determined
that business expense deductions of prepaid insurance should be
prorated over the life of the policies.9 However, the First Circuit, in
Welch v. DeBlois'0 held that a cash basis taxpayer could deduct in-
1. Waldheim Realty and Inv. Co., 25 T.C. 1216 (1956).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (1) (A), 53 STAT. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 162(a)).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (2) -(3), 53 STAT. 16 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 263 (a)).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, 88 23 (1), (n), 113 (a), (b), 114, 53 STAT. 14, 40,
44-45 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167, 1011-12). See also INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 461.
5. Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 674 (1931).
6. Home Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1933).
7. Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B.T.A. 841 (1934).
8. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931).
9. G.C.M. 13148, XIII-I Cum. BULL. 67 (1934).
10. 94 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1938). The court said the practice of buying insur-
ance for a term of years was a well-recognized business custom and expense,
and such an expenditure could not be considered as a capital expenditure.
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surance premiums in the year in which they were paid. As a result
of this decision the Commissioner reversed his official position in
1938.11 The Tax Court, however refused to follow the Welch decision
in a few instances.'2 Welch v. DeBlois was soon expressly overruled
by Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n,13 which held that the
deduction must be prorated over the life of the policy. As a result, in
1943 the Commissioner again reversed himself and reverted to his
original 1934 position.14
Since 1943, and until the instant case was decided, the First Circuit
and the Tax Court 15 have required proration of prepaid insurance pre-
miums even though the taxpayer was utilizing the cash basis account-
ing system. The instant case refused to follow the First Circuit and
elected to follow the overruled Welch decision.'6 As a result, in the
Eighth Circuit at least, prepaid insurance premiums are deductible
in the year paid. In justification of its decision that prepaid insurance
is an ordinary and necessary business expense and not an amortizable
capital expenditure, the court points out that (1) since 1905, this
cash basis taxpayer has always deducted prepaid insurance in the
year premiums were paid and (2) no substantial distortion of income
resulted from such treatment of insurance deductions.
The decision creates some confusion in the uniform administration
of the income tax law. Now, in the First Circuit deductions for pre-
paid insurance must be prorated over the life of the policies, while in
the Eighth Circuit the same deduction may be taken in the year pre-
miums are paid.17 As a result at the present time the administration of
certain tax laws is geographical. While the Supreme Court frequently
grants certiorari in cases of conflict between the circuits, it will not be
surprising if the court refuses to do so here. Technical accounting
rules for tax administration are better formulated by the Congress.
Although the instant case creates an obvious conflict and an adminis-
trative problem for the Commissioner, it seems that the case is rightly
decided. The problem is one of timing deductions, and the holding of
the instant case is consistent with the theory of cash basis tax account-
ing-deductions should be taken in the year paid. At least this case
brings into focus the inconsistent treatment of prepaid income and
11. G.C.M. 20307, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 157.
12. Frank Real Estate & Inv. Co., P-H 1939 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 39, 499; George
S. Jephson, 37 B.T.A. 1117 (1938).
13. 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). See Note, 56 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1943). The
court was concerned to some extent with the possibility of distortion of income
if a full deduction was allowed in any one year.
14. G.C.M. 23587, 1943-1 CuM. BULL. 213.
15. Bessie Cohen, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 51,009 Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C.
1236 (1945).
16. "We believe that the opinion in the DeBlois case is more persuasive than
the Boylston Market opinion." 245 F.2d at 828.




prepaid expenses. The Commissioner requires prepaid income to be
reported and taxed in the year received 18 while it has been thought
that prepaid expenses must be prorated over the life of the amortizable
asset. This inconsistent treatment does not seem fair to the taxpayer.
It is hoped that the Congress will correct this situation by providing
for uniform and consistent treatment of both prepaid income and
prepaid expenses. This treatment can now be accomplished with little
difficulty for those cases in which it can be shown to the court that no
substantial distortion of income results when a cash basis taxpayer
takes deductions for prepaid expenses in the year in which the ex-
penses are incurred.
INCOME TAXATION-DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE
EARNINGS-PREMIUMS ON LIFE INSURANCE POLICY TO
FUND PENSION CONTRACT WITH SHAREHOLDER-OFFICER
A close corporation purchased an insurance policy on the life of its
president and majority stockholder, who owned 98% of the stock in
the corporation, in order to fund a pension contract with him.' The
corporation was the beneficiary, possessed all the incidents of owner-
ship and paid the premiums out of surplus, not claiming a deduction
therefor. The policy was treated as an asset on the books of the cor-
poration constituting a fund from which the corporation was not
bound,2 but could, if it so chose, satisfy its oligations under the pension
contract. The Tax Court held3 that the payment of these premiums by
the corporation was, in effect, a distribution of earnings to a share-
holder4 and, therefore, taxable to the stockholder as income.5 On
appeal, held, reversed. Premiums paid by a close corporation for an
insurance policy on the life of taxpayer designed to fund a pension
contract with him are not taxable to him as a distribution of income,
even where he is the holder of substantially all the corporate shares,6
18. North American Oil Consoldiated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
1. The corporation obligated itself to pay the president, Oreste Casale, $500
per month upon his reaching age sixty-five or, in the event he should die prior
to this time, then $50,000 to his estate or whomever he should name.
2. The corporation could make pension payments out of surplus or current
profits if they were available. The insurance policy and its proceeds did not
constitute a special fund from which the pension obligations were to be satis-
fied, safe from claims of other creditors of the corporation.
3. Oreste Casale, 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
4. Pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 115(a), 53 STAT. 46 (now embodied
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301, 316 (a)).
5. Ibid.
6. The Tax Court had held that the corporation was merely a conduit
through which Casale accomplished his desired objectives.
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as long as such payment is a corporate investment 7 for the direct and
immediate benefit of the corporation and results in no direct economic
benefit to the taxpayer. Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir.
1957).
When a corporation pays insurance premiums on the life of an
officer or employee and the estate or family of the insured is the
beneficiary, the premiums are taxable to the insured as additional
compensation.8 If the insured is also a stockholder, this payment may
be taxable as a constructive dividend.9 However, when the corporation
is the direct beneficiary and the insured shareholder has no nonforfeit-
able rights in the policy, then the payment of premiums is an invest-
ment of corporate capital,10 and there has been no taxable distribution
to the insured shareholder. The 1944 case of Lewis v. O'Malley" dem-
onstrates that even though the insured benefits to some extent under
the policy, it is possible that the premium payments will not be con-
sidered taxable income to him, as long as the corporation is the primary
and immediate beneficiary.
Recent decisions of the Tax Court have been less favorable to the
taxpayer. In Henry E. Prunier12 it was held that reservation of the
right to change beneficiaries was a sufficient benefit to the insured to
constitute the premium payments a direct economic advantage to him
and, therefore, taxable income. In another recent case, Sanders v.
Fox, 3 the court was willing to look behind the corporate entity in
separating and weighing the benefits to the corporation and those to
the insured. Reservation of the power to designate the beneficiary
plus the fact that the insurance proceeds were restricted to a special
fund for the purpose of carrying out a buy-sell stock agreement were
considered to be a sufficient benefit to the insured stockholder to make
these premium payments corporate distributions and, therefore, tax-
able as dividends. In the instant case, the absence of any of the inci-
dents of ownership in the insured stockholder, the immediate avail-
ability of the policy as security for loans, availability of the policy and
its proceeds to creditors of the corporation 14 and the probability that
7. If Casale had died between the ninth and thirteenth years of the policy,
(he would reach age sixty-five during the thirteenth year) the corporation
would have received an amount substantially in excess of its obligation under
the contract.
8. Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694
(1937); Frank D. Yuengling, 27 B.T.A. 782 (1933), affd, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.
1934); N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930); George Matthew Adams,
18 B.T.A. 381 (1929).
9. Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1946); Casper Ranger Constr. Co., 1 B.T.A. 942 (1925).
10. Merrimac Hat Corp., 29 B.T.A. 690 (1934).
11. Lewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
12. 28 T.C. No. 4 (April 12, 1957).
13. 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).




the policy would be worth substantially more to the corporation than
its obligation to the insured 15 combined to convince the court that
it was unnecessary to look behind the corporate entity. The court
concluded that this insurance policy was indeed an investment medium
of the corporation fulfilling a valid corporate purpose, and not a cor-
porate distribution resulting in taxable income to the insured stock-
holder.
The holding of the instant case is in conformance with past decisions
concerning the corporate payment of insurance premiums on the lives
of officers, employees and stockholders. The importance of this case
lies not only in the fact that it furnishes an example of the method to
be followed in establishing and administering key-man and buy-sell
stock agreements funded by the corporate purchase of life insurance
policies, but also because it contains a caveat that there must be no
direct benefit to the insured or the premium payments will be declared
a corporate distribution and taxable as income. This case should have
no effect on the holding of the Prunier case, as the two cases are dis-
tinguishable.16 Whether the restriction of the insurance policies and
their proceeds to a special fund not available to creditors of the cor-
poration to fund a buy-sell stock agreement is alone a sufficient inter-
est in the policy to make premium payments taxable as a corporate
distribution is a question not answered by this case. This holding is
more favorable to the taxpayer than that of the Sanders case because
this court declined to look behind the corporate entity in identifying
the benefits to the insured. The lesson to be learned is that the insured
person should receive no nonforfeitable rights or direct benefits under
the policy, and that the corporation should not only be the direct bene-
ficiary, but should also derive immediate economic benefit from the
payment of the premiums under the policy.
17
15. See note 7 supra.
16. Since the writing of this note, the Prunier case has been reversed by
the First Circuit, on the ground that under Massachusetts law the corporation
was the true beneficial owner of the insurance policies in question. (RECENT
CASES) CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAx REP. ir 10,015. The Tax Court decisions in
Prunier and Casale serve as danger signals warning against carelessness in
insurance planning.
17. See Miller, Insurance, Annuities, and Other Employee Benefits from the
Executive's Point of View, 33 TAxEs 964 (1955).
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JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF STATE COURT
DETERMINATION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In a patent infringement action for damages in a federal district
court defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of col-
lateral estoppel, asserting that in a previous state court action brought
by plaintiff for accounting under a royalty contract the same issue of
patent coverage had been decided adversely to the plaintiff.1 Plaintiff
contended that the state court decision was not binding in this action
because the two causes of action were different and because the state
court would not have had jurisdiction to decide the issue of patent
infringement, had it been brought directly before it for determination. 2
On appeal from a summary judgment for defendant, held, affirmed.
A state court decision in a royalty contract suit determining that
licensee's device was not within the scope of a patent bars litigation of
the same issue in a subsequent infringement suit between the same
parties in federal court. Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956).
The doctrine of res judicata is based on a policy requirement that
a controversy, once litigated, should forever be set at rest.3 The
term is commonly applied to the situation in which a judgment is held
to bar retrial of the same cause of action in a subsequent suit between
the same parties.4 Collateral estoppel is the subsidiary doctrine that
when a fact essential to a judgment is litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between
the parties in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action.5 An
1. Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 384 Pa. 12, 119 A.2d 205 (1956).
Plaintiff sought accounting in equity by defendant company for royalties
allegedly due under patent licensing agreement. In its answer defendant
averred, among other defenses, that the device produced by it did not infringe
plaintiff's patent. The issue of infringement was therefore an "ultimate fact"
within the meaning of Judge Learned Hand's definition in The Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), and subject to collateral estoppel.
2. Plaintiff's two other contentions were dismissed summarily by the court:
(a) The argument that the former judgment should not apply because this
suit charged infringement over a different period of time was held to be
without merit. Since the plaintiff conceded that the same patent and device
were at issue, the court held that collateral estoppel still applied, on authority
of Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). (b) Plaintiff's argument
that the construction of patents is a matter of law to which a state judgment
is not collateral estoppel in the federal courts was held not acceptable. The
court said the question of infringement is a finding of ultimate fact, to which
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable, The Evergreens v. Nunan,
141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); and that
even the determination of a pure question of law is collateral estoppel in such
cases if no unjust result would follow. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591
(1948).
3. 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS §§ 504, 506 (1891).
4. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 47, 48 (1942).
5. Id. § 68.
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exception to this doctrine has been recognized when the court which
incidentally determined the matter would have had no jurisdiction to
entertain the controversy directly.6 Early precedents were set by
applying the exception to courts of limited jurisdiction as to subject
matter,? or to cases in which a state court necessarily determined
ownership of land in another state.8 When state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter at issue, it is uniformly
held that collateral estoppel applies. 9 However, since original juris-
diction over cases concerning patent controversies is restricted to
federal courts,10 the drafters of the Restatement of Judgments" as-
sumed that, when decisions in state court cases required determination
of patent infringements, such findings would not be binding in a
subsequent infringement suit between the same litigants before a
federal court.'2
The principal case establishes the rule that, after a state court has
determined in a contract suit that defendant's device is not within
plaintiff's patent, the fact of noninfringement is conclusively estab-
lished for purposes of a subsequent federal infringement suit. 3 The
court's reasoning proceeds from the settled doctrine that state courts
have authority to determine questions-as distinguished from cases-
under the patent laws.14 Prior to this decision such questions decided
by state courts were issues of title to patents,15 contracts covering
patents, 16 and the validity of patents; 17 but the Supreme Court had not
ruled on the conclusive effect of these determinations in federal court
6. 30 AM. JUR., Judgments §§ 182, 183 (1940); 50 C.J.S., Judgments § 731
(1947).
7. Baker v. Hart, 3 Atk. 542, 26 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Ch. 1747); Loomis v. Loomis,
288 N.Y. 222, 42 N.E.2d 495 (1942), reversing, 262 App. Div. 906, 28 N.Y.S.2d
809 (2d Dep't 1941).
8. Norris v. Loyd, 183 Iowa 1056, 168 N.W. 557 (1918); Greer v. Greer, 189
S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), reversed on other grounds, 144 Tex. 528, 191
S.W.2d 848 (1946). But see Bailey v. Tully, 242 Wis. 226, 7 N.W.2d 837, 145
A.L.R. 578 (1943).
9. 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 520 (1891).
10. 28 U.S.C. 1338 (1952).
11. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71, comment c (1942).
12. Professor Austin Wakeman Scott of Harvard, who acted with Professor
Warren A. Seavey as joint reporter in preparing the Restatement of Judgments
for the American Law Institute, has written concerning this point that "[a]
though the authorities are somewhat meager, it seems clear that the judgment
should not preclude the parties as to the matter in a subsequent action between
them brought expressly to determine the matter in a court which has juris-
diction to determine it." Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L.
Rv. 1, 18-19 (1942).
13. 238 F.2d at 514.
14. Pratt v. Paris Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
15. Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Whitney, 6 Fed. Cas. 349, No. 3,134
(C.C.D.N.J. 1876); Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Whitney, 6 Fed. Cas. 345,
No. 3,133 (C.C.D.N.J. 1875).
16. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473 (1912);
Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 34 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
17. Pratt v. Paris Light & Coal Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
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suits.18 However, Justice Holmes said in Becher v. Contoure Labora-
tories, Inc.19 that a state court's determination of the fact of ownership
of an invention could serve to estop relitigation of the same fact in a
subsequent patent infringement suit in a federal court,20 and this
precedent had been applied in lower court cases.21 The instant case
extends these limits of state determination to include the fact of
infringement. In effect, this decision lifts patent fact controversies
from the exception outlined in section 71 of the Restatement of Judg-
ments, 2 while directly discrediting comment c through the dicta of
Judge Mars.
23
In an era when court dockets are bulging with pending cases it is
understandable that the-public policy consideration of avoiding re-,
litigation of issues should prevail over the more academic desire to
preserve the symmetry of the law.24 It is probable that Congress was
motivated primarily by a desire to obtain consistency in patent juris-
prudence rather than a distaste for state adjudication when it vested
exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters in federal courts. Therefore,
as long as incidental state court rulings on patent matters are confined
to fact issues which do not encroach on the federal courts' mandate
to construe the patent laws, such rulings should continue to be col-
lateral estoppel in federal courts.
18. Instant Case, 238 F.2d at 513.
19. 279 U.S. 388 (1929).
20. "That decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the Courts of
the United States does not give sacrosanctity to facts that may be conclusive
upon the question in issue. A fact is not prevented from being proved in any
case in which it is material, by the suggestion that if it is true an important
patent is void-and, although there is language here and there that seems to
suggest it, we can see no ground for giving less effect to proof of such a fact
than any other. A party may go into a suit estopped as to a vital fact by a
covenant. We see no sufficient reason for denying that he may be equally
estopped by a judgment." Id. at 393.
21. Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mg. Co., 34 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Zachs
v. Aronson, 49 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1943).
22. "If an action is brought in a State court on a promissory note, and the
defendant in his answer alleges that the note was given for a void patent,
the decision of the court that the patent was or was not void is not binding
on a subsequent action brought in a federal court to have the patent declared
void, or to enjoin an infringement of the patent..."
23. It is interesting that Judge Mars served on the American Law Insti-
tute's Committee or Judgments which drafted the Restatement.
24. "The question in all these cases is one of public policy. Should a court
which has not been entrusted with jurisdiction to determine a matter be
permitted to determine it incidentally, not merely for the purposes of deciding
the controversy which it can properly decide, but also with the effect of
precluding the parties from litigating the question in courts which alone are
entrusted with jurisdiction to determine it directly." Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22 (1942).
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LABOR LAW-SECTION 301 OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT-
ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS TO
ARBITRATE FUTURE DISPUTES
Plaintiff-union and defendant-employer entered into a collective
bargaining agreement containing specified grievance procedure, the
last step of which was arbitration at the request of either party. A
subsequent controversy over work loads and work assignments was
processed through the established grievance procedure, but no
settlement being reached, the union requested arbitration in accord-
ance with the agreement. The employer refused and the union brought
suit in the federal district court, which held that the employer must
submit the grievance to arbitration as provided in the agreement.
The court of appeals reversed,1 holding that the district court had
jurisdiction to entertain the suit but that in the absence of authority
under either state or federal law it could not grant such relief. On
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, held (7-1), reversed.
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act2 not only gives federal district
courts jurisdiction of controversies involving labor contracts in in-
dustries affecting commerce, without regard to diversity of citizen-
ship or amount in controversy, but also authorizes federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for enforcement of those collective bar-
gaining agreements and included within that federal law is specific
performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bar-
gaining agreements. Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
Beginning with dicta in Vynior's Case,3 the common law devised the
rule that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes would not be en-
forced by the courts and was revocable at will by either party. This
seemed to be the rule at common law in the majority of American
jurisdictions. 4 The courts apparently took the view that presently to
enforce an arbitration agreement made in the past would be to re-
linquish their present jurisdiction over the parties and compel the
parties to submit the determination of their presently existing legal re-
lationships to extra-judicial bodies, thereby depriving the courts of
their proper function.5 Although growing out of commercial arbitra-
tion, the rule seems to have been applied equally to cases involving
1. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
2. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 61 STAT. 156, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1952).
3. 8 Co. Rep. 816, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609). For complete early history see
STURGES, COmMERciAL ARBrTRATION AND AWARDS (1930).
4. For a compilation of holdings, see Annot., 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941).
5. Dunton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 104 Me. 372, 71 Atl. 1037 (1908);
Rentschler v. Missouri P. Ry., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
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collective bargaining agreements.6 Although the common law rule
has been changed in some states by statute7 a number of jurisdictions
have held these statutes to be inapplicable to arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements.8
At the federal level there seemed to be some doubt whether prom-
ises to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining agreements were
enforceable. The Federal Arbitration Act, although modifying the
general common law rule to the extent that agreements to arbitrate
future disputes are now enforceable generally, excepts from its cov-
erage "contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 Although a stay of proceedings order pro-
vided for in the arbitration act has been granted in an action for
breach of such a contract, 0 most courts refuse so to act on one or more
of several grounds, the most important seeming to be that the arbi-
tration act excludes from its operation collective bargaining agree-
merits."
There has been sharp judicial dispute over the applicability of sec-
tion 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 to arbitration agreements and collec-
6. Goldstein v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL, 328 Pa.
385, 196 Atl. 43 (1938); Utility Workers Union, CIO v. Ohio Power Co., 9
Lab. Arb. 1024 (1947).
7. AnRz. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (1939); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1280 (Deering
1953); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-10 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8151 (1949);
LA. REv. STAT. § 9:4201 (1950); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 251, § 14 (1956); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.2483 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (1955); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2A:21-1 (1951); N.Y. Civ. PnAc. ACT § 1448-69; OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§8 12148-1 to -17 (Baldwin 1952); ORE. REv. STAT. § 33.220 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 161 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 10-3-2 (1956); WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.04.010 (1952); Wis. STAT. § 298.01 (1955).
8. See, for example, Utility Workers Union, CIO v. Ohio Power Co., 77
N.E.2d 629 (Ohio C.P. 1947); Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Allen-
Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609, 49 N.W.2d 720 (1951). For a more detailed treat-
ment, see, Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration
Agreements, 17 U. Cur. L. REv. 233 (1950).
9. 61 STAT. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1952).
10. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, CIO, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.
D.N.Y. 1951).
11. International Union, Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Work-
ers Union, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952); Matson Nav. Co. v. National
Union of Marine Cooks, 22 L.R.R.M. 2138 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
12. "(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose ac-
tivities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts
of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the
United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization
as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any
individual member or his assets." 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
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tive bargaining contracts. Some courts adopted the view that it merely
gave federal district courts jurisdiction over disputes involving labor
organizations in industries affecting commerce, without regard to the
amount in dispute or to the diversity of citizenship. 13 This view would
seem to say that section 301 simply creates a forum in the absence of
diversity jurisdiction 4 but does not give the federal courts any
power different from or additional to that which a state court would
have if the action had been brought there.15 The majority view held
that section 301 not only granted the federal courts jurisdiction over
cases involving such disputes, but also authorized such courts to estab-
lish a body of federal substantive law and to apply it to the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining provisions.16 Included in this body of
federal law is specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances
under collective bargaining agreements.'7 The Court in the instant case
adopts the majority view that contracts to arbitrate future disputes
may be specifically enforced under section 301. Justices Burton and
Harlan concurred that federal courts could grant specific performance
in such cases by virtue of inherent equity power but did not feel that
section 301 authorized the development of federal substantive law. In
13. United Steelworkers, CIO v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1957); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL v. Jay-
Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956) (semble); Paterson Parchment Paper Co.
v. International Brotherhood of Paper Makers, AFL, 191 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.
1951); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th
Cir. 1951); Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F.
Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Boeing Airplaine Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial
Dist. Lodge 751, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950),
aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951).
14. United Steelworkers, CIO v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., supra note 13.
15. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th
Cir. 1951).
16. Signal-Stat. Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956); Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1954); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 437
(1955); Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union, AFL v. Gillespie Milk Products
Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Arista Mills Co.,
193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951); Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International
Moulders Union, 193 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1951); AFL v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod
Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950); Schatte v. International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950); Bakery Workers v.
National Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1949); United Automobile Work-
ers, CIO v. Buffalo-Springfield Roller Co., 131 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ohio 1954);
Food & Service Trades Council v. Retail Associates, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); International Longshoreman's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,
114 F. Supp. 249 (D. Hawaii 1953); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Work-
ers Union, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952); Pepper & Potter, Inc. v.
Local 997, United Auto Workers, CIO, 103 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950);
Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. United Furniture Workers, CIO,
76 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md.), af'd 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).




his dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter went to some length to set forth
the views he expressed in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Em-
ployees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.18 His view is that section 301 is
purely procedural and that therefore no substantive law or additional
modes of relief could be derived from it.19
The once unenforceable collective bargaining provision to arbitrate
future disputes is now enforceable. However, there remain the
problems of developing the substantive law to be applied 20 and of de-
termining the relationship of federal and state courts in applying this
law. Yet, it would seem that this decision reaches a desirable re-
sult in spite of the uncertainties remaining. A badly needed addition
to the power of federal courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate fu-
ture disputes has been realized and confusing and conflicting views as
to the state of existing law have been clarified.
LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-EMPLOYER
LOCKOUT TO PRESERVE MULTI-EMPLOYER
BARGAINING BASIS
An employer association of eight linen supply firms was negotiating
with respondent union, bargaining representative of the truck driver
employees of the association members, for a new contract when the
union called a strike' against one of the association members. The
other members retaliated with a temporary lockout and notified the
union that employees would be recalled when the strike was called
off. Negotiations continued, and when a new contract was signed,
the lockout and strike ended. The union then filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB charging the other seven members
of the association with violation of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947.2 The 1NLRB found that the lockout was justifiable against
18. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
19. For an extensive discussion of the problems and conflicts involved prior
to this decision, see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L. J. 167 (1956).
20. "The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature
of the problem .... Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern,
not state law .... But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may
be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy. . . .Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal
law and will not be an independent source of private rights." Instant case,
353 U.S. at 457.
1. Striking against the members of a multi-employer bargaining group
one at a time is commonly referred to as "whipsawing" or a "whip-saw
strike." NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Int'l Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL, 353 U.S. 87, 90 n.7 (1957).
2. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952). The union charged interference
with rights under section 7, thereby violating sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of
[ VOL. 11
1957] RECENT CASES
a threat of strike action, such threat per se constituting an economic
problem which could be defended against by a temporary lockout.3
The court of appeals reversed4 and a writ of certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court.5 Held, reversed. A temporary lockout to
preserve a multi-employer bargaining basis against the threat of a
"whip-saw strike" is not an unfair labor practice under the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
449, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
Employer lockouts6 had been divided into two types by the Board
prior to 1952, under both the Wagner Act7 and the Taft-Hartley Act.8
Those justified by the existence of an independent economic motive
were upheld,9 while those merely discriminating in employment to
discourage membership in a labor organization were struck down. 0
the Act. Section 7 provides: 'Employees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . ." 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952). Section 8(a)
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 .... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (3) (1952).
3. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
4. Truck Drivers Local 449, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. NLRB,
231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
5. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL,
352 U.S. 818 (1956).
6. The meaning of the term lockout has not been uniform. There is no statu-
tory definition of the term. It has been defined by judicial decisions as the
cessation by the employer of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort
to gain for the employer more desirable terms. Iron Molders' Union v.
Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908) (concurring opinion). The
NLRB has not defined the term and its decisions reflect a wide diversity in
concept of its meaning. See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951)
(cessation of operations due to inefficient operation caused by a strike in one
department); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (closedown to
avoid property loss); Lengel-Fencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938) (a shutdown by
employer in a fit of anger during an argument with a union representative
without any intent to interfere with union activity); Hopwood Retinning Co.,
4 N.L.R.B. 922 (1938) (mass discharges in reprisal for union activity). In
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), the court
used the term lockout synonymously with layoff, suspension and temporary
severance, and distinguished it from discharge and permanent severance.
7. National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66
(1952) (popularly known as the Wagner Act).
8. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-97 (1952), (popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act).
9. Betts Cadillac Olds., Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) (operational difficulties
may have arisen by an unannounced work stoppage); International Shoe
Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) (work stoppage in one department on a production
line); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (spoilage of materials);
See also Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockout Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 70 (1956); Koretz, Legality of the
Lockout, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 251 (1953).
10. The L. B. Hosiery Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1950); Augusta Chemical Co.,
83 N.L.R.B. 53 (1949); D. H. Holmes Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 753 (1949); Scott Paper
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In 1952, the Board was confronted directly for the first time with the
question of whether an employer could use the lockout or unit layoff
as a means of economic pressure in collective bargaining and concluded
that it was an unfair labor practice." In several subsequent decisions,
the Board maintained the position that only independent business or
economic reasons could justify a lockout.12 However, several courts
of appeals denied enforcement of such Board orders, feeling that em-
ployer lockouts could be used as a counterbalance against employee
strikes.
13
In the instant case the Board had reversed its earlier position and
sanctioned the defensive lockout as applied to multi-employer units. 14
The court of appeals, in reversing the decision, had reasoned that the
Board usurped congressional power to legislate when it sanctioned
the multi-employer bargaining unit. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the decision of the court of appeals, rejected this reasoning, pointing out
that multi-employer bargaining units had long antedated the Wagner
Act and that although attempts had been made to include limitations
on such organizations during the debates leading to passage of the
Box Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 535 (1949); Quest-Shon Mark Brassiere Co., 80 N.L.R.B.
1149 (1948); Piedmont Cotton Mills, 79 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1948); Sifers Candy Co.,
75 N.L.R.B. 296 (1947).
11. Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952). It should be pointed out that despite the decisions
of the Board there has been a widespread assumption in the labor relations
field that the lockout was correlated to a strike. A contract signed in Febru-
ary, 1937, between General Motors Corp. and the United Auto Workers, CIO,
contained the following provision: "The union and the employer agree that
there shall be no strike or lockout without first using all possible means of
peaceful settlement of any controversy which might arise." (Emphasis added.)
Such a provision is still standard procedure in union employer contracts today.
UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES, ff 51,701.14 (CCH 1957), has the following model
provision for labor contracts: "Employees represented by the Union shall not
engage in any strike, sitdown, slowdown, or work stoppage during the life of
this Agreement; nor will the Company engage in any lockout during the life
of this Agreement." Other government agencies which are or have been in-
volved in labor problems have taken a similar attitude. The War Labor
Board of 1918 in its statement of policy said there should be no strikes or
lockouts during the war. This was carried forward to the National War
Labor Board of 1942. In the labor-employer agreement preceding the
appointment of that Board it was agreed that there would be no strikes or
lockouts. This attitude was reflected in Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 FED. REG. 237
(1942), establishing the National War Labor Board. "Whereas, as a result of
a conference of representatives of labor and industry which met at the call
of the President on December 17, 1941, it has been agreed that for the duration
of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts, and that all labor disputes
shall be settled by peaceful means, and that a National War Labor Board be
established for the peaceful adjustment of such disputes." See also TAYLOR,
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1948).
12. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Valley Steel Products
Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1338 (1955).
13. Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951). See also NLRB v. Spaulding
Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955) (dictum); NLRB v. Continen-
tal Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
14. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
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Taft-Hartley Act, such proposals had failed of enactment. Agreeing
with the position of the Board, the Court held that non-struck mem-
bers of a multi-employer bargaining group could, without violating
the Taft-Hartley Act, lock out their employees to preserve the effec-
tiveness of the multi-employer bargaining basis. Although the Court
did not directly answer the question of whether this right to lockout
is a corollary of the employee's statutory right to strike, it did note
that the protection of the right to strike by the Taft-Hartley Act is
not so absolute as to deny self-help to employers where legitimate
interests collide.
The decision in the instant case upheld the present position of
the Board to balance conflicting interests by permitting members of
a multi-employer association to temporarily lockout employees in
order to preserve the group bargaining basis. There is no determina-
tion in the instant case that the employer lockout is correlative of the
union's right to strike, but such a pronouncement would not mean
too much as both are in fact limited by Taft-Hartley. There is no
absolute right to strike, of course, and the Taft-Hartley Act regulates
strikes, forbidding some as violations of the law. On the other hand
there are undoubtedly other permissible uses of the lockout. It may
be that in the future a lockout will be held to be an unfair labor
practice only in those cases where it is used to frustrate organizational
efforts, to destroy bargaining representation or to avoid the duty to
bargain.
MILITARY LAW-JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL-
TRIAL OF OFFENSES COMMITTED DURING PREVIOUS
ENLISTMENT OF ACCUSED
The army enlistment of Sergeant James C. Gallagher expired while
he was a prisoner of war' of the Chinese Communists in Korea. Upon
return in a prisoner exchange he was honorably discharged and re-
enlisted2 for three years. Two years later Gallagher was convicted
by a general court-martial3 of murder committed while a prisoner of
1. While Gallagher was a prisoner, Congress adopted the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. IV, 1957) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as UCMJ). This resulted in charges against Gallagher for offenses
arising under the Articles of War and also under the UCMJ.
2. Gallagher was discharged because of expiration of enlistment and
processed in accord with Army Reg. 615-360, 24 June 1953. He was dis-
charged on October 27, 1953 and re-enlisted at 9:00 the following morning.
3. Trials occurring after May 31, 1951, although of offenses against the
Articles of War and committed prior to the adoption of the UCMJ, were con-
ducted under the procedure prescribed by the UCMJ. MANUAL FOR COURTS
MARTIAL UNITED STATES iX (1951).
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war.4 The defense contended that military jurisdiction over prior
enlistment offenses ceases on discharge and is not revived by re-entry
into service. The conflict resolved into a determination of whether
jurisdiction was lost by discharge or preserved by UCMJ article 3 (a) .5
The Army Board of Review, believing that article 3 (a) had been held
unconstitutional, ruled that jurisdiction was lost.6 On appeal, held,
reversed. Article 3 (a) is constitutional when applied so as to preserve
jurisdiction over discharged servicemen who have re-enlisted. United
States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
Military law finds its constitutional authority in the express power
of Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.7 Its authority8 exists independently from the
judicial power of the United States conferred by article three of the
Constitution.9 Courts-martial, therefore, are exclusively creatures of
Congress,10 and their jurisdiction" cannot be extended beyond those
limits which Congress has fixed by statute.12 The individual service-
4. Gallagher was convicted of two offenses of unpremeditated murder under
former Article of War 92 (41 STAT. 805) now UCMJ art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918
(Supp. IV, 1957); three offenses of mistreatment of fellow prisoners of war
and one offense of collaboration with the enemy under former Article of
War 96 (41 STAT. 806) now UCMJ art. 105, 10 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. IV, 1957);
and one offense of misconduct as a prisoner of war under USMJ art. 105, 10
U.S.C. 905 (Supp. IV, 1957). He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge,
total forfeitures of pay and allowances and life imprisonment.
5. 10 U.S.C. § 803 (Supp. IV, 1957) (art. 3): "(a) Subject to section 843
of this title (article 43), no person charged with having committed, while in
a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this
chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or of a State,
a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved from amenability
to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of that sfqtuc."
6. United States v. Gallagher, 21 C.M.R. 435 (1956). This court believed that
a hiatus occurred in the accused's service at the moment of discharge and that
he then had a free choice either to accept re-enlistment or retain his dis-
charge status.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895);
People ex rel. Garling v. Van Allen, 55 N.Y. 31, 35 (1873) ("Courts-martial
were instituted for the trial of naval and military offences, and existed as
early as the reign of James II, and probably had their origin in the ancient
Court of Chivalry. They are regarded as a necessity in every civilized govern-
ment, in order to properly discipline the military forces, by punishing
offences therein.").
8. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (Congress is auth-
orized to subject persons actually in the armed services to trial by court-mar-
tial for military and naval offenses); United States v. Mackenzie, 30 Fed. Cas.
1160, No. 18,313 (S.D.N.Y.).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III.
10. Ex parte Wilson, 33 F.2d 214 (E.D. Va. 1929). See also Rose ex rel.
Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir. 1900); United States v. Mackenzie, 30
Fed. Cas. 1160, No. 18,313 (S.D.N.Y.).
11. The jurisdiction of a court-martial is based upon three indispensable
requisites: (1) the court must be appointed by an official empowered to ap-
point it; (2) the membership must be in accordance with the law with re-
spect to number and competency to sit on the court; (3) the court must be
invested by act of Congress with power to try the person and the offense
charged. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 14, para. 8 (1951).
12. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); Dynes v.
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man is subject to military law only by virtue of his military status. 3
Military status and court-martial jurisdiction are co-existent and are
co-terminous upon discharge. 14 Termination of such status tradition-
ally has barred military prosecution for offenses committed prior to
discharge15 even where the serviceman immediately re-enlists. 16 This
practice remained untrammeled until 1950 when Congress provided
that military jurisdiction over certain offenses would no longer be
extinguished by termination of military status.'7
A literal and fair interpretation of article 3(a) would appear to
reinstate court-martial jurisdiction over countless numbers of dis-
charged servicemen, including both civilians and those who re-enlisted,
for trial of offenses which previously had been barred by a termination
of military status. The Supreme Court in Toth v. Quarles'8 declared
this act unconstitutional 9 when used to extend military jurisdiction20
over civilians for offenses committed while they were in service as it
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857); Ex parte Wilson, 33 F.2d 214 (E.D. Va.
1929); United States v. Mackenzie, 30 Fed. Cas. 1160, No. 18,313 (S.D.N.Y.).
An act of Congress granting jurisdiction to a court-martial must be strictly
conformed to. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887). For a judicial
limitation on Congress' power to confer court-martial authority see Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
13. Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11
(1921); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157
(1890). This emphasis on status was developed in the congressional debate on
the original counterpart of Article of War 92. "A man's liability to punish-
ment by a court-martial must necessarily depend on his status, that is,
whether he is in the military forces . . . or whether he is not . . . ." CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863).
14. Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944); Ex parte Drainer, 65
F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
15. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410
(N.D. Cal. 1946); United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787
(E.D.N.Y. 1919); United States v. Lucas, 19 C.M.R. 613 (1955); United States
v. Pitts, 14 C.M.R. 522 (1953); United States v. Santiago, 1 C.M.R. 365 (1951).
Under certain circumstances court-martial jurisdiction has been unheld even
after discharge: Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921); Mosher v. Hunter, 143
F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp.
667 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W. D. Wash. 1933);
In re Craig, 70 Fed. 969 (D. Kan. 1895) (former servicemen serving sentence
imposed by court-martial); Barrett v. Hopkins, 7 Fed. 312 (D. Kan. 1881)
(expiration of enlistment after arrest but before trial); In re Bogart, 3 Fed.
Cas. 796, No. 1596 (D. Cal. 1873) (fraud on the government); United States v.
Simms, 20 C.M.R. 720 (1955) (discharge on foreign soil); United States
v. Solinsky, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 153, 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953); United States v. Isidore,
7 C.M.R. 595 (1952) (discharge for convenience of the government).
16. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United
States v. Lucas, 19 C.M.R. 613 (1955).
17. See note 5 supra.
18. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
19. This does not mean that Congress cannot provide a means for trial
of ex-servicemen for offenses committed while in service but only that such
means must be in accord with that power conferred upon Congress by article
III of the Constitution.
20. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Lisk, 145
Fed. 860 (E.D. Va. 1906) (ordinarily citizens of the United States, not in
military service, are not subject to the jurisdiction of a military court).
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would deprive them of trial by jury21 and other basic safeguards2
guaranteed to them by the bill of rights. The question of constitution-
ality of the statute when used to preserve jurisdiction over servicemen
for previous enlistment offenses was solved, temporarily at least,2
by the instant decision. The court declared article 3 (a) constitutional
when applied to an accused who was a serviceman at the time of the
offense and at the time of trial.24
It is certain that article 3 (a) was enacted to prevent a re-occurrence
of the demoralizing result2 of Hirshberg v. Cooke.26 It is unquestioned
that the morale and discipline of the service would be disrupted by
allowing traitorous or criminal offenders to overcome justice on a
technicality 7 and continue to serve as a member of the military
community. But the emotions of legislative government must not run
rampant in barricading escape routes which men like Hirshberg and
Gallagher have made detestable. The necessity for promoting the
success of the military must not be allowed to infringe on those rights
which Americans have fought to protect throughout our existence.
21. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. For a discussion of the principles underlying
the right of trial by jury see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935);
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich.
9, 97 Am. Dec. 162 (1868); STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE C. 10 (1947). For cases
which influenced the founders of our government to protect the right of
trial by jury see Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (Eng. 1783);
Penn and Mead's Case, 6 I-1gw. St. Tr. 951. (Eng. 1670) (after trial the jurors
were fined for acquitting Penn contrary to the court's instructions. One was
imprisoned for not paying the fine, but the Court of Common Pleas released
him in a habeas corpus proceeding, upholding the freedom of the jury to
decide the case. Bushell's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (Eng. 1670)).
22. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U. S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. In proceedings for habeas corpus a court can consider only whether the
military tribunal had jurisdiction to act in the case under consideration. Hiatt
v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921); Swaim v.
United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
24. One question which remains unanswered is the effect which the length
of separation from the service will have upon the revival of jurisdiction. What
will happen if a discharged offender is recalled into service many years
after the offense? There is broad language in the instant case which would
indicate that jurisdiction will be revived no matter how long the separation.
25. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (dissent); Hearings Before the
House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1262
(1950):
"Mr. Smart: (reading article 3a) ... Now, that will get the Hirshberg case
where he reenlisted. It would get Hirshberg even though he had not re-
enlisted.
"Mr. Brooks. That will close up that loophole?
"Mr. Smart. In my opinion it will, sir.
"Mr. Brooks. What is your opinion?
"Mr. Elston. I am inclined to feel it would.
"Mr. Brooks. All right, if there is no objection, then, we will adopt that
language."
26. 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
27. The cutting .off of court-martial jurisdiction by discharge at the expira-
tion of a term of enlistment.
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The decision in Toth v. Quarles justly curtailed the broad sweep of this
act by re-opening a path for those who no longer have a connection
with the military. In the instant case the Court of Military Appeals,
acting in accord with legislative intent, affirmed the conviction of a
professional soldier and in so doing violated no rights afforded to the
military by the Constitution.28
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-
TORT LIABILITY ARISING FROM PERFORMANCE OF
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
Plaintiff's husband died of smoke suffocation as a result of a fire
which broke out in the municipal jail in which he was incarcerated.
In a wrongful death action against the municipality, plaintiff alleged
that her husband's death resulted from the negligence of a police
officer in leaving the jail unattended and the prisoner unprotected
against the fire. On appeal from an order sustaining the municipality's
motion to dismiss the complaint, held, reversed. Under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, a municipality is liable in a wrongful death
action for the negligence of a police officer. Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
The municipal corporation is often said to be a dual personality.'
Courts generally recognize that a distinction exists between acts and
duties which are private or proprietary and those which are public
or governmental.2 Tests to determine the classification of the munici-
pality's functions vary,3 but usually the operation is classified as
28. See SNEDEKER, MIUTARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORMi CODE C. 20
(1953). These rights, according to General Snedeker, are: the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; the right to have the
assistance of counsel; the right to a speedy trial; the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; the right to have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor (U.S. CONST. amend. VI); protection against
compulsory self-incrimination; due process of law; protection against double
jeopardy (U.S. CONST. amend. V); protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures (U.S. CONST. amend. IV); prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishments and excessive fines (U.S. CONST. amend. VIII); and other rights re-
tained by the people and not delegated to the federal government (U.S.
CONST. amend. IX).
1. Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942). The case of Bailey v. The
Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842) is said to be source of the concept
of the bifurcation of the municipal entity.
2. 38 Am. Jun., Municipal Corporations § 572 (1941).
3. Some of the more important tests for determining sovereign functions
are enumerated in Note, 1 BROoiLmY L. REV. 85, 88 (1932): "The municipality
acts in a governmental capacity
"I. When it performs a duty imposed by the legislature of the state.
'II. Only when such imposed duty is one the state may perform and which
pertains to the administration, of government.
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proprietary whenever the profit element is present.4 It is usually
held that while acting in its private capacity, a municipality is liable
for negligence to the same extent as a private corporation or indi-
vidual.5 The obvious reasoning behind this rule is that it is not the
duty of a municipal corporation to engage in a purely business or
commercial enterprise.6 On the other hand, the rule almost universally
recognized is that absent some statutory provision,7 there can be no
recovery against a municipal corporation8 for injuries resulting from
"III. When the municipality acts for the public benefit generally, as dis-
tinguished from acting for its immediate benefit and its private good.
"IV. When the act performed is legislative or discretionary as distinguished
from ministerial."
4. Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 AtI. 805 (1909); Foss v. Lansing, 237
Mich. 633, 212 N.W. 952 (1927).
5. Splinter v. Nampa, 70 Idaho 287, 215 P.2d 999 (1950) (granting of permits
by city to place structures in, under, on, or about streets and alleys is
exercise of a proprietary, not a governmental function); Krantz v. Hutchinson,
165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227 (1948) (recovery from city for property damage
resulting from dike constructed by city officials more than five miles from
city limits); Stein v. Newark, 25 N.J. Misc. 170, 52 A.2d 66 (Cir. Ct. 1947)
(city furnishing water to private consumers acted in a private business
capacity); Oklahoma City v. Haggard, 170 Okla. 473, 41 P.2d 109 (1935)
(garage operated by city for motor vehicles used by police department is
considered a proprietary function); See Green v. Amarillo, 244 S.W. 241
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (operation of a street railway system by city is private
function); Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939) (operation
of swimming pool by municipality held to be business); Seaman v. Big
Horn Canal Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 391, 213 Pac. 938 (1923) (municipality that sup-
plies the inhabitants with water does so in its proprietary or business
capacity).
6. "It is no part of its duty, as a municipal corporation, to engage in a purely
business or commercial enterprise. When it seeks and obtains from the Legis-
lature permission to engage in such an enterprise, its act in so doing is purely
voluntary on its part .... It is then engaged in an ordinary business enter-
prise, and is bound by all the rules of law and procedure applicable to any
other private corporation or person engaged in a like enterprise." Henry v.
Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N.W. 664, 665-66 (1913).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8: "The state hereby waives its immunity
from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have
the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to
actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided
the claimant complies with the limitations of this article." "New York is
probably the most liberal state in the union as to governmental tort liabil-
ity.... Since New York has thus made itself and all its agencies and political
subdivisions, including counties and municipalities generally liable for torts
and since the court of claims is a court of record with appeal permitted to
the appellate division and ultimately to the court of appeals the number of
reported opinions in suits against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions
(suable in regular courts) far exceeds those from any other state." Leflar
and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363, 1391
(1954). For a complete summary and classification of tort liability of the
states and their subdivisions, see Leflar and Kantrowitz, supra.
8. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) marks the
beginning of the application of the principle of sovereign immunity to the
smaller governmental units. It is important to note that a distinction is made
between municipal corporations proper and quasi-municipal corporations, the
general rule being that the latter are not liable in tort unless a statute so
provides. While the Men of Devon case is often distinguished where a mu-
nicipal corporation is involved, it may still be applicable to the quasi-municipal
corporation. See generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 41-45 (1924); 3 VAim. L. Ray. 835 (1950).
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performance of its governmental functions.9 Underlying this doctrine
exempting the municipal corporation from private action for torts is
the basic reasoning that the municipal corporation's undertakings
which are governmental in nature are not for the promotion of the
private interests of the municipality, - but rather for public benefit.10
According to judicial decisions, the municipality in managing its
jails is exercising a purely governmental function," and is not liable
for injuries caused by police officers in the performance of such func-
tion.'2 Refusing to follow the general rule, the court in the instant
case recedes from its former position 13 concerning a municipal cor-
poration's immunity when sued for the torts of police officers under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. In reasoning to its conclusion,
the court denounces the idea of immunization in the exercise of gov-
ernmental functions as being anachronistic to our system of justice
and to our traditional concepts of democratic government.14 The
court's decision is also based on its disapproval of the theory that the
individual should suffer a grievous wrong in preference to imposing
liability on the citizenry vicariously through their government. 15
In answer to the argument that stare decisis was being ignored, the
court merely presents the thought that "judicial consistency loses its
virtue when it is degraded by the vice of injustice."' 6 Actually the
court feels that it is restoring the original concepts announced by the
Florida Supreme Court in 1850,17 when the Men of Devon'8 'decision
was distinguished on the proposition that the action there was against
9. See Flait v. Mayor & Council, 48 Del. (9 Terry) 89, 97 A.2d 5'45 (1953)
(furnishing fire protection for city is governmental function);. Ahkend v.
Kansas City, 173 Kan. 26, 243 P.2d 1031 (1952) (city not liable for negligence
of its employees engaged in repairing streets); Hinds v. Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d
401 (Mo. 1948) (municipality not liable for assault by policeman of person
in its jail).
10. 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.24 (3d ed. 1950).
11. See Oppenheimer v. Los Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 2d 545, 232 P.2d 26
(1951); Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080 (1943); Gurley
v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693 (1948); Wittenbrook v. Columbus, 35
N.E.2d 980 (Ohio App. 1941); 18 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
53.94 (3d ed. 1950).
12. See Archer v. City of Austel, 68 Ga. App. 493, 23 S.E.2d 512 (1942) (no
liability for death of prisoner by suffocation proximately caused by marshal's
leaving him without proper ventilation); Gentry v. Town of Hot Springs, 227
N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85, aff'd, 227 N.C. 668, 44 S.E.2d 87 (1947) (city not liable
for death of one who suffocated in fire when jail was left unattended by police
officers who previously had assaulted prisoner); 18 McQumuLN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 53.80, 53.94 (3d ed. 1950).
13. Brownlee v. Orlando, 157 Fla. 524, 26 So.2d 504 (1946); Kennedy v.
Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938); Brown v. Town of Eustis, 92
Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
14. See Leflar and Kantrowitz, supra note 7, at 1363-64 n.6.
15. See 38 AM. J-R., Municipal Corporations § 573 (1941).
16. 96 So. 2d at 133.
17. Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
18. See note 8 supra.
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all of the people of an unincorporated community having no corporate
fund.19
This direct attack on the present general rule is considerably more
encouraging than previous whittlings which have only resulted in
confusion 20 and incongruities.21 The instant decision leads one to
believe that future Florida decisions will ignore the governmental-
proprietary distinction. The practical solution to the problem could
very well be the use of liability insurance both as a substitute for
and a supplement to governmental liability.22 Since tort liability is
a normal risk involved in the conduct of any activity, it seems feasible
that insurance against the risk would be an effective step in the
direction of eradicating the injustices which result from the applica-
tion of the theory that the sovereign is immune from tort liabilities
arising from performance of its governmental functions.
19. "[H]aving no corporate fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each
corporator would be liable to satisfy any judgment rendered against the
corporation .... But in regular corporations, which have, or are supposed
to have, a corporate fund, this reason does not apply." Tallahassee v. Fortune,
3 Fla. 19, 24 (1850).
20. Compare Mocha v. Cedar Rapids, 204 Iowa 51, 214 N.W. 587 (1927)
(operation of swimming pool is governmental function), with Hoggard v.
City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939) (operation of swimming
pool is proprietary function); Mayor & Alderman v. Jordon, 142 Ga. 409, 83
S.E. 109 (1914) (sweeping streets is governmental function), with Louisville
v. Hans, 167 Ky. 160, 180 S.W. 65 (1915) (liability for failure to remove
garbage can from sidewalk); Keller v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac.
505 (1919) (operation of public park is governmental function), with Warden
v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925) (maintenance of public
park is corporate function); Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356
(1904) (liability for negligence of elevator operator in city hall), with
Howard v. New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925) (operating elevator
for criminal court building is governmental function).
21. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) (immunity from responsibility
for assault by police officer); Brownlee v. Orlando, 157 Fla. 524, 26 So. 2d 504
(1946) (municipality not liable for jailor's assault of prisoner who sub-
sequently died as a result); Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So.
2d 825 (1946) (liability to injured citizen for negligence of police officer who
was driving an automobile); McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616
(1939) (city not liable for alleged malicious prosecution by police officer);
Lewis v. Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937) (liability to prisoner who con-
tracted communicable disease while in city jail); Ballard v. Tampa, 124 Fla.
457, 168 So. 654 (1936) (liability for negligence of police officer in permitting
injury of prisoner working on public streets); Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84
Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922) (liability for negligent operation of a fire truck).
22. See Leflar and Kantrowitz, supra note 7, at 1413-15.
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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-DUE PROCESS AND
COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS-STATE TAX ON
FOREIGN CORPORATION'S NET INCOME FROM LEASE OF
PROPERTY TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The taxpayer, a corporation doing no business in Arkansas and
having no property there, leased freight cars to railroad companies
in Utah. In the course of the lessee's use, these cars passed through
Arkansas, making no stops for loading or unloading. Arkansas im-
posed a tax' on the taxpayer's net income derived from the lease,
apportioned to the mileage the cars traveled through the state. The
taxpayer paid the tax under protest and brought suit for refund,
alleging violation of the commerce and due process clauses of the
Federal Constitution. On appeal from a judgment for the taxpayer,
held, reversed. Where a foreign corporation, pursuant to a contract
executed outside the taxing state, leases railroad rolling stock for
use in purely interstate commerce, a state tax on that portion of the
income which is attributable to the lessee's use of the rolling stock
within the taxing state does not violate the commerce clause or the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Commissioner of Rev-
enues v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 296 S.W.2d 676 (Ark. 1956).
The constitutionality of a state tax levied upon a multistate business
may be subject to challenge on two grounds: the commerce clause,
which limits a state's right to interfere with the free flow of interstate
commerce,2 and the due process clause, which prohibits a tax upon
an activity not having sufficient contact with the taxing jurisdiction.
For purposes of the commerce clause, a distinction is made between
a gross receipts and a net income tax, the latter being considered
more favorably.3 A gross receipts tax on a multistate business,
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2003 (1947). The statute provides for a tax on
income of Arkansas property of non-residents, whether or not the non-
residents are qualified to do business in the state and whether or not the
business is conducted in interstate commerce, with the amount of the tax
based on net income properly allocated as net income arising from owner-
ship of property within the state.
2. Various tests have been applied by the Supreme Court from time to time
to determine the scope of the commerce clause. For a brief discussion of
the tests, see HARTMAk, STATE TAxATIoN OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 21-48
(1953). See also Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce--"Direct
Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496
(1951).
3. "A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion to its
magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable or otherwise. Con-
ceivably it may be sufficient to make the difference between profit and loss,
or to so diminish the profit as to impede or discourage the conduct of com-
merce. A tax upon the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since
it does not arise at all unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and
losses, and the tax cannot be heavy unless the profits are large. Such a tax,
when imposed upon net income from whatever source arising, is but a
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whether engaged solely in interstate commerce or in both intra- and
interstate business, is invalid unless it is so apportioned as to reach
only those receipts derived from intrastate commerce.4 When levied
on net income, however, a tax on a business engaged in both intra-
and interstate commerce has been upheld even though applied to the
total net income from both, as this is said merely to place an "indirect
and incidental" burden on interstate commerce.5 Where the business
is purely interstate, the courts seem to distinguish between a tax
levied on the net income itself as the subject, which was assumed
until recently to be valid,6 and a tax on the privilege of doing inter-
state business measured by the same net income, which has fallen
categorically before the commerce clause. v Whether a tax levied
directly on the net income from a business that is exclusively inter-
state violates the commerce clause has been the topic of copious
comment,8 centering around the Supreme Court decisions in Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. BeeZer9 and Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Con-
nor.'0 In the Beeler case, Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court,
stated that a tax on the net income of an exclusively interstate busi-
ness was not prohibited by the commerce clause." In the Spector
case, which held invalid a privilege tax measured by net income from
method of distributing the cost of government, like a tax upon property .. .
United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918).
4. This is true even when the tax is imposed upon a local activity and
properly allocated. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422
(1947); Meyers v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912).
5. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918). For a vivid
explanation of this rule, see the dissent in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 610 (1951).
6. This assumption apparently stems from the fact that when a privilege tax
measured by net income was levied on an exclusively interstate business,
the Supreme Court, in declaring the tax invalid, would emphasize the privilege
as being the objectionable incident of the tax. This apparently was the
basis of Mr. Justice Stone's statement in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler,
315 U.S. 649, 656 (1942), that a tax not on the privilege of conducting the
business, but on the income itself would be valid. This assumption appeared
to be further settled in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166
P.2d 861, aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), when the Supreme Court
upheld a tax statute construed by the California Supreme Court to include a
tax on the net income of an exclusively interstate business. There was no
opinion given in that decision, however, and opponents of this tax are quick
to point out that there is a possible ground for distinguishing that case as
involving some intrastate commerce.
7. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). See Barrett,
"Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clauses To State
Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740, 780-84 (1953). This distinction evidences the
fact that following a particular statutory ritual may be more important con-
stitutionally than the economic consequences of the tax.
8. Compare Cox, Interstate Commerce and a State's Right to Revenue, 30
T.xEs 25 (1952) (which would hold the tax valid), with Clark, Interstate Com-
merce and a State's Right to Revenue: a Rejoinder, 30 TAXEs 263 (1952);
Marsh, Interstate Commerce: State Taxation of Motor Carriers, 41 A.B.A.J. 603
(1955) (the latter writers would hold the tax invalid).
9. 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
10. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
11. 315 U.S. at 656.
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a business that was solely interstate, a footnote by the Court suggested
that Justice Stone's statement was not essential to the decision of
the Beeler case.12 The Spector declaration has been interpreted by
some legal writers as abrogating the distinction between taxes im-
posed on net income and privilege taxes measured by net income,
and thus placing a commerce clause condemnation on both kinds of
taxes.13
The Arkansas court in the instant case adopts the Beeler view and
permits the tax to stand. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently
held a similar tax unconstitutional because, although labeled a prop-
erty tax, the levy in effect taxed the privilege of carrying on inter-
state commerce.14 In reaching this result, the court apparently fol-
lowed the inference to be drawn from the Spector case that a tax
on net income violates the commerce clause. In a third case involving
almost identical facts, the Kentucky Supreme Court avoided the
question by interpreting their statute as not authorizing such a tax.15
That court held that income derived from a lease made outside the
state had its source outside the state; therefore the tax had "no relation
to a subject within the taxing jurisdiction."' 6
Use of the due process clause as a means of invalidating a state
taxing statute has occurred with increasing frequency in recent years.
A state may not, in reaching for a source of revenue, impose a tax
on a subject which results in taxation of extraterritorial values.17
The basic test used to determine a state's "jurisdiction to tax" appears
to be whether the tax in practical operation has relation to the oppor-
tunities, benefits or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing
state sufficient to justify its imposition.18 The general rule is that a
state has jurisdiction to levy a property tax on any tangible property
located within its boundaries although the taxpayer is an out-of-state
corporation.19 This rule has been applied to uphold a state property
12. 340 U.S. at 609 n.6.
13. Proponents of this view maintain that the Supreme Court, in criticizing
the statement made in the Beeler case, was laying the groundwork for inval-
idating such a tax. They point out that there is a ground for distinguishing
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, af'd per curiam,
328 U.S. 823 (1946), as involving some intrastate commerce and the fact that
the court did not cite the West case in the Spector decision. See Marsh, supra
note 8.
14. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner 377 Pa. 234, 103 A.2d 700 (1954).
15. Kentucky Tax Comm'n v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 294
S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1956).
16. Id. at 556.
17. "[N]o state may tax anything not within her jurisdiction without vio-
lating the Fourteenth Amendment." Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930). See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S.
662, 667-68 (1949); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
18. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
19. See generally Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Prop-
erty, 56 YALE L.J. 641 (1947) and articles cited therein. For a brief discussion




tax on rolling stock moving entirely in interstate commerce so long as
the tax is fairly apportioned to the length of time spent or the number
of miles traveled within the taxing state.20
In the instant case Arkansas clearly could have imposed an ad
valorem tax on the taxpayer's property.21 Although the reasoning is
not clear, the court held that the income tax did not violate the due
process clause. It would seem that if there is sufficient connection with
the state to justify the imposition of a property tax on the out-of-state
lessor's interest in the property, an income tax should likewise be
constitutional unless the taxes are so inherently different that the
state has insufficient interest in the res to impose an income tax. A
possible distinction might lie in the fact that a property tax is based
on the state's immediate protection and domain over the physical
property, whereas an income tax is imposed upon one's right to
derive gain from the property employed within the state. Further-
more, if the lease contract, rather than the leased property, was re-
garded as the source of the income, then, since the lease was made
outside the state, the state might have no power to tax the income.22
While the due process objections as applied to a situation such as
the instant case are as yet unexplored, it would seem that the taxing
state should be given considerable latitude in choosing the precise
manner of the tax as long as it is affording in return the requisite
protection to the taxpayer.
The Supreme Court has never directly determined the constitution-
ality of a tax of the type involved in the instant case. Whether such
a tax would be struck down on commerce clause objections would
depend upon whether the Beeler or the Spector view of the effect of
a tax on net income appealed to a majority of the new Court. Since
the Spector case, in which the Court divided six to three, four new
Justices have been appointed. If a majority could not agree that this
tax violated the commerce clause, there might yet be sufficient
grounds upon which a majority could agree that the connection be-
tween the taxing state and the subject of the tax is insufficient to
satisfy due process.
20. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); American
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899). While the vehicles may
be taxed, it is equally clear that the freight may not be taxed. Hughes Broth-
ers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Case of the State Freight
Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
21. American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
22. See note 15 supra.
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